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was the policy of the eslsaisl. pomr to dislodge powor from 
the ruling slit© who mro tmeooperativo and plae© it i.® the 
hands of thou# aatle# iadivldtiftl* who weald obey orders fro® 
the colonial odMisiotratloa* the .British An India adhered 
to this policy e1
la the pr&mm of nation formtlea sines ladopea»
i
4m m » a small native odoeoted alasa has emerged to jxravido 
the ©i^aaimtieiiel leadership for the new political entity * 
This class t edaaated la Western way*» b m m m  cpite aof&iatl* 
eaied in the tastiaa and tasteî ttaa #Jf .political. pemr« A© 
the colonial administrator# departed* their aativa aufcordic. 
Mt#« were preaeted hr the new wffwtmttfo fro® tha lower 
MMgwrial and ©lories! post® to fill vacancies* la their 
new position of power they fetgan to m m m i m  m m m l  over 
the oeaatry * Heir# to the iantrnmMto and pemetleee of 
power t they m m  m m  their own waster® end wars not subject 
to order* twm the higher echelon of &**&«« or the
Hag©#* Also# they had the support of the native mss s m «  
Mato which had oodo life eapleeeeM for tho deported oolo* 
alol power®« Furthermore*, they m m  afel© to utilloo the 
powerful force of MtioooliM to rally support for pro Joe tod 
goal*«
the national ©lit* groups in the developing m l  ion©
« _,. Collar*, iwamwit A M&jLsgAJSMiC »*wTorhi MusRillsa and Cmpeayl •*$?'« pp»
4
m i  1st fairly aaally described*: Typically ihay aoaatltata 
its® than oiie*»te&th of on® par teat of lb# pegoilatlea* they 
h&m raaaivad * w«tir« •dttMtto# at itaab tftrwtgh high 
aahool* as! Utny tun# to *oi»aftti*ta in tfea larger eibios#. 
they far&lah bit# Xaadardtiji far daattrtt type ®Fg»nlm%lm»t 
labor xadAm^ peMiieni parti##* and prefaasioaal
flitir ability t# apeak a tfaatm laafaagp la 
additdoa he- their a«&iy* teagna araataa aa offaetlva tbtnaal 
through wbieli ifeatarm taawladga tan fee J&tradaaad into bmU* 
w a r d  a r e s ® *
IteftortwiiataXyt tfca political ayatea la which the 
elite pradaotaatad wee net a prodtet of their #«» political 
eanrlrotmettt# Hipy of the adapted fcaa&ani p o litic a l -stwe* 
tar®® were therefore la conflict with tie daap* underlyingq 
.rtlisiatttj) et&mal^ and feiaborieitl m % m m  of the m m  
fiartlMtfWMr«« the tvaftaj&aaaad taatitmbloiis were oat oaptMe 
of sroftttlRK radical efeaagaa* *fba hhatory o f the emerging, 
aatioas elaarly  lad iaa t** bt»% the goreroatatai iattitmtioae 
of adalalatratiaa aai otmhrel which bad %mn davtlapad by 
the colonial e«t»in!«tyabieiwi ©w r the year# w e r e  w ell #«tab«* 
liahtd and reatataat to abaaga**^ la a titn tia a a  adapted by
1«Mm »* U m m *  M M I t e l i l  1Catmtrlea flew forks J« wfl^fiSo Sand*» lat*.*
îleary frank 0eedw».p Jg|f .i.Iyil ieipEief faMatjat 
{lew 8avaai Tala fclyaraity fraaay i W b  p* ft*
the dovoloping society thus thwarting progra®© that wr© 
dosigaod to alter tbm status too« in the p®&t~&M@pmdmeQ 
period* ®&rmmrt there m m  little immediate 1 m m % t m  to 
change* Prime ny roqttloitoo w t  the imiftfconttftoo of ardor.
.MMl OftllOOtiOfl Of tOJCSO*
In the typical a w  *otio&» tiioroforo* political 
pcwor came to root in %hm h&M© of an odttootod nativo clooo 
wfcioti aonopollgod tbo rospooolblo positions in the govern**
ttORt«
la.abort* the no* a»tioii^p«ri»»# a dotiulo or nor® 
after ooMoolof ind«p*pd®®et*»*4ss toeing run by the higher 
vMkftng civil mod atili tary officerse those off Soars 
m m  So #» oaoootftaily strong powor poslties* tot*, 
bsrring. boon odoootodttwboMovor i«porfo«ti.y*»*la the liberal 
traditions of tho $•**» they hovo a ooooo of guilt, la 
& aoaoo* history .bos oomo a full circle in on© genera* 
tioa tilth oao no Jar different©*' tho ruling bureaucracy 
is native rotbor'tboft foroigtt* tho n m  nuing group '■nay bo u&gorstondably uneasy when it considers tho fato 
of its prodooomoroft'
1m order to inoroooo the prottlgo of the regime 
both within the country and abroad the bureaucratic 
lMd«rsblp nay pronttigftta » nan constitution* this bonds to insure a oontiimation of aid from ths tiootorn 
nations, iitbongb p m to of the constitution nr# r©~ 
plot© tilth familiar democratic terminology* it is m m % ly 
clear to the trained abssrvtr that it is not a 4«m» 
orabit ecmstitttticn* tfe© Xcglslatlv# body is sot up 
in such « way that it csa bo readily Oooisotod by tht 
@ m m tiro branch of tbo govorwont* • « « 0ano»ilf on© 
finds that the legisMtnro lacks the pooor to roimoo 
the oioo of tour©uueraeies**~whether civil or military** 
merely by cutting the budget, * . »
Once ©at*bllsh«d0 the military resist any- chang©
which might m m %  to weak#®, or render loss secure its 
<m& position of domination |, on the other hand it presses 
for projooto likely to enhance its ability to control ths nfttion© thus it supports immtmmit, to tmpmm the 
transportatioa ani coa^unication aystes# to raise 
health otantfordo* to upgrade the torching of .scientific
* pp*
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S«vele$dug ® w m t r i m  M b. aede this m i b#r suspicious of any
regime that declares it# goal te be the est«bllsiM*0t of
deweersey* Tfe® oligarchy which g m m m  Pefcteteii h m  declared
deassswty be be it# goal* Whether this Is t .geimisi# a®plra«
ttsx remains to be seen* tbie paper will explore the role
end setloas of the power soatftn&srs in ftskistsu is m  effort
to tfetersltte the trae nature of their eewMitaant to the
ideals of d m m r m f *  eehieve thle ebi«etlire» the author
jpreyeeee to m m i m  the eeossnle philosophy* power tosses*
end political «etlvetie«ke of the#© group# which control the
power streetere of Bekiatea* Essentially the question la;
6*» as etttfaeyiteriee oriented pelitim l  structure ssd **
tutds&deretle » hierarch#lly organised society, 4onis#tei toy
selfish elasses, achieve m m  a aedieww of denetreeyt
Bsfeistss wee eleeeifiei by SMI# in 1959 ## a frolic
tieel system whieh ie controlled by a **s4*v&iflsg ellgtr*
efcgr*” 4 »©d#rMslfsf oligarchy Is described by Shlls as a
political eyetee
* • * eeafcrelled: fey toureewsretis and/or military effl*
©or eli^eee is whleh SeMoerstie eosstitutiou* hare feeea suspended or In which they do not exist* The goal® of 
the slit# m f  or *ey not include democra t IsatAone Hi© 
andereieing impulse usually take# the form of a eoseerxt 
for efficiency #*s$ rationality« Staterslsefcles ellgsr* 
Chios are usually strongly eetiwtedl toward economic development. TM ■ structure ef wedersising
oligarchic® eoaeestrstes power is the haude of a clique 
of adlitsry officers or feureauersts whs are usually 
placed in control of the chief Mtslstries* Turkey 
under Atsturfc and contemporary Pakistan and the Sudsn
#
ar® of nwtaraisisg oligarch!«•**
this paper will sadssvar to test the validity of 
iM a  c lassification  a* i t  applies to Pafcistsii in  1965«
It has taken centuries for a democratic and ladm®o 
trlslissd society to waive la many smwtrtsft of the Most® 
the underdeveloped countries of tho Ssstsm hsa&sptisrs hop© 
to sefeisvs these foolo in a single gonoration.* ©on thin 
b ®  oooo»s»llshftd if' following democratic goals! ilier® tlit 
moo of tb® population lives at ottboiotoitoo level or slightly 
above p is it rsssouftbl* to oxpoet reprmm%m%im
lion itoiuuBnod Ayub Ifean. led a military eonp 
of tie parliamentary gororammt in Pskist&n# it stated tint 
hia ultimate «lm n m  to introduce a. constitution m i  rootoro 
constitutional life „2 ftroi^lsoat this study# the ‘troth of 
M s  Intent 1# to bo oxoaisod« The method h m  bam to review 
tli# power structure of the military government * which In 
this instance m m  s Miliary oligarchy with aodsraisiag m** 
plratiofts* Tbs underlying theory# wMcb so categorised tho 
military gowrweat of Pakistani# .isae dotorninod the line of 
aaalyals.fr Thus* the Initial eoeditiOBO which prevailed whoa 
■martial law urns sstabilslMd will, be the has® from wMet* its® 
efforts to modernise will be *jnml&td«
t&twsrd Shil»# cited la Alatoad and Coleman» ®&<, &!%»«.
P« 51*
%#hj»i®d. Ayub Elan# friends Wot Master*! (Mm forks 
Oxford ttaiveralty i¥sss» t w ) ,  p» 77*
9
Whm MMurtiaX law was established p authority was
sentrailaad and strictly controlled» with the at® that
atablltty fe# established*. Ibis was the power base 
which could instigate polities! change* Th# iapetws was 
gapeadttit tipoa tha t®pla®e»tabiaii of lyub I ban8® intentions*
this study is tonsemsd with the removal of martial 
law aiti the ietobXlefcuMmt of elected and selected imtblbu** 
tiooo« The trtneltleit which hat taken plate ao»t h© ana** 
lyietf to determine the extent that theee institutions art 
foaotiottios* there a transfer of powor m 4 if a## to 
what extent may it b# utilised? Is Integral unite of »#** 
tioisol growth# the concern %hm m m m  to the rolo of the 
institutions in the erolutloft toward® a full 4m m m ® f 0 If 
th« military oligarchs' 1® truly modernising» thoro will fee 
evidence of those institutions porfondng a political fane** 
tioa m &  are not partly facades to placate the &oj}«rwll&g 
eliteac
likewise,# If the soaMHttiM toward is
being saintaiBod# there should be evidence that the military 
oligarchy la receptive to the dananda of the uea-raXiug 
elites and the interest groups« The network of eeMutlea* 
ties® should permit a free flow of weoeages to and firm the 
ruling elite* If tha restriction and censure of apposition 
articulation is stifled# then the deaocratic process ha© 
been halted* this study will seek for signs of compromise
w
batwaea % M  opposition groups mti tho ruling alii®*
tfee period of ttwly 1* fplttftrtly aaoaarttad with the 
mrm**fmr &p m  in the tmmty y m m  that Paklataa has existed, 
es « polities!.! entity* In 19$$* tha eoup d*atat ©f Ayufc 
ihatt aigaalad the abrogation of #©aishltmti©;«3. govanMiant* 
Saaaxk year# later national aiaetiosa war® hold* fhaaa tita 
aaaa^a providad & dasareatioa ©I* time in which m  study tha 
political proa#*#*
Hawairar* it k m  proved expedient An so»a aeotiona ©f 
this 8%u4y to axtand beyond 196$* Is aaeb olraaasfcanaa# 
tha rtparouaaiotia of legislation css ha Filmed and an aaaaaa* 
twut Aoda of tha daaoaoatiaiai process„
Notarial for this papar ws® gathered froa ft aariatp 
of aaaraaa« It included parlodlaalay tooka* infanaatlait 
pattphlata and paraonal ltttar?i«wa« Hawavar* aanaorahip of 
the press in Pakistan sad# it aaoaaaary to faly an material 
printed elsewhere for a critical, analyaia of donaatie poll* 
elaa* and the avaluaklan of dawaaratia davalejmant* Thra* 
ntwapapara war# inapaetad: tha .London .Tlqaa* tha M m  .lurk 
flues« sad the fakjfttan (lahore) tlnaa* $geapt for tha 
latterj there wara ralativaly faw articles dealing, with the 
them# of this paper* the Pakistan times came under censor- 
ship and therefor# was dlaao&t&uaad as a soar©#*
lot all research sources from Pakistan w®r# disre**- 
gardad* hut this writer mda an effort to avaluata tha
tf
material in torus of it being vehiele* of gm m m m m t  prop** 
saa&e« The theoretic*! framework was provided by ftheorle* 
presented by United.. State* antliors® and m u i m m m  in. t)ui 
dmAopeuMt of the paper was giveo by Political $o~
gfarb»t«t a*«ber*»
CHAPTER IX
THE POLITICAL AND HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
OF PAKISTAN
The most powerful outside influence on India for 
three centuries preceding partition in 1947 was that of 
Great Britain, whose traders, accountants, civil servants, 
and soldiers gradually introduced western concepts of law, 
education, democracy, and administration,, The higher caste 
Hindus were the first to comprehend these new ideas and used 
every opportunity to obtain a modern education in the newly 
established colleges. As a result, they gradually became 
dominant in the British-led public services, the professions, 
and commerce. On the other hand, Muslims, who ruled a sub­
stantial portion of the Indian subcontinent at the time the 
British last India Company was gaining a foothold there, 
showed their contempt for the newcomers by turning their 
backs on the language and the culture of the lest. In time 
the Muslim leaders revised their attitude toward the learn­
ing of the West, but increasingly they resented the greater 
influence of the Hindus.1 The Muslims feared that as a 
minority group in an independent and democratic India, they
1 Khan, Friends Not Masters. on. cit.. p. 159.
12
13
would be relegated forever to a secondary position# Under 
All Jinnah*s effective leadership, they pressed for and were 
ultimately successful in obtaining a separate and sovereign 
nation in which the majority of the citizens were Muslims*-*
In 1947 Great Britain surrendered its sovereignty 
over India* Simultaneously, India was partitioned and most 
of the Muslim majority areas became the independent nation 
of Pakistan*
In both East and West Pakistan the population is 
predominantly poor and illiterate* A typical family income 
is about 1250 rupees (approximately $250 U.S. dollars) per 
year and is derived from agriculture* More than BO per cent 
of the people in Pakistan live in one of the country*s 
100,000 villages* One of the more important elements in 
the life of a Pakistani family, apart from the struggle to 
exist, is religion, Islam affects the diet, marriage eus~ 
toms, primary education, and polities#^
The enormous and complicated task of dividing the 
personnel, the assets, and the liabilities of India was 
assigned to a Partition Council created about two months 
before partition. The Council, assisted by steering com* 
aittees, dealt with every aspect of administration,
1Donald M, Wilbur, Pakistan (Hew Haven; Hraf Press,
1964), p» 11B*
2Alfred Guillaume, Islam (Baltimore; Penguin Book 
Ltd*, 1962), p. 101*
14
orgsiiisatio®# personnel, record*, foreign relations*,
armed services# and trade and currencyJ The Muslim civil 
servants in India and the non-Muslim civil servants in 
Pakistan were allowed to decide their future nationality 
for themselves* Approximately 25 POCXS government employees 
and-their families# with 60#000 tons of personnel baggage # 
had to he transported from Delhi to Karachi.# A special train 
service for them was suspended because of derailment and the 
looting and murdering of passengers which was taking place 
at the borders * treaty airplanes of the British Overseas 
Air Corporation were chartered and many thousands of 
government personnel were evacuated fro© Delhi fey air during 
the first two weeks of September# 194?*2 In this exchange 
of persons# Pakistan obtained a surplus of cultivators and 
artisans# but lost most ©f its merchants# clerks# account* 
ants# and profeaalonalSo
It has bee® estimated that 6,000#000 Muslim refugees 
came to Pakistan# and 5#500,000 Hindus and Sikhs left Pakis­
tan* Most of the people traveled m  foot# the largest ©on* 
voy ©f persona numbering 400*000* Accurate figures are not 
available# but it ham been estimated, that 17,000,000 per­
sons crossed the borders fro» one territory to another
(Princeton: » pp« 397-96 <>
%hroftQloirr of Pakistan 1947-57 (Karachi i Kami 
Publications# 'August, 1 $WT, pp« 14* fo.
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between 1947 and 1950.1 During these population movements 
riots* massacres, looting, and arson broke out on a scale 
that was completely unimagined or foreseen- About a million 
persons died, 500,000 of whom were Muslims, Property loss 
and damage were beyond account. For those successful in 
their trek there were further hardships to come, Refugee 
camps were unable to meet the demands for food and lodgings. 
Also, the receipts given by the governments, both Indian and 
Pakistani, for belongings and assets left behind by the refu­
gees were usually delayed. In these distressing conditions, 
many of the refugees were forced to eke out an existence 
in whatever manner they could. The events and incidents 
which occurred during this period of mass migration further 
magnified the enmity that existed between the Muslims and 
Hindus,^
The establishment of a capitol for a nation of 
eighty million people in a few months* time would have been 
a remarkable feat under the most ideal circumstances. In 
Karachi the circumstances were far fro® ideal. Prior to 
1947 Karachi had been a relatively quiet, clean port and 
commercial center with fewer than a million citizens, the 
majority of whom were Hindus, and other non-Muslim groups.
10. H. K, Spate, India and Pakistan (Londons Methuen 
and Company, 1963), p. 118.
^Richard Syraonds, The Making of Pakistan (London: 
Faber and Faber, Ltd., 1950), p. $4.
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By 1951 the census indicated that the population had more 
than doubled and that it was now 96 per cent Muslim, most of 
them refugees from India. The results were massive conges­
tion, a breakdown of the sanitary facilities, and the estab­
lishment of makeshift refugee slums. All commercial and 
banking operations were at a virtual standstill.
In this chaotic setting all of the essential mechani­
cal paraphernalia of government had to be found and put in 
its proper place; phones, files, typewriters, and office 
furniture.
Partition and Nationhood
In spite of the confusion associated with the crea­
tion of Pakistan, the structure of government changed little 
at partition. A parliamentary form of government was estab­
lished, headed by the Governor-General from Pakistan. It is 
true that rudimentary forms of parliamentary government had 
existed on the Indian subcontinent since the British govern­
ment Introduced the Constitutional Reforms of 1919. The 
reforms were enlarged and extended under the Act of 1935* but 
they did not provide a genuine or full-fledged form of par­
liamentary government. let, the British themselves appar­
ently did not think that a parliamentary government, fashioned 
after the British system would be successful if established 
in the subcontinent. In its debate on the Indian Act of 1935,
1?
a committee of the British parliament was distinctly pessi­
mistic about the future of parliamentarianism in India, 
arguing that "with the best translation, the essential 
meaning was lost*"1 The committee agreed that the essential 
components which had contributed to the success of the 
parliamentary system in Britain; such as the principle of 
majority rule, the willingness of the minority to accept 
for the time the judgment of the majority and the existence 
of great political parties divided on political policies 
rather than by regionalism, were absent on the subcontinent.^
Despite the presence of these obstacles, the new 
federal government was adopted during the summer of 1947*
The provinces of Sind, Punjab, Worth-West Frontier, Baluchis­
tan * and Bengal were each granted a provincial legislature. 
Initially, it was the aim of the British to transfer or 
delegate more power from the central government to its 
provinces, However, during World War II the governments 
had broken down in the majority of the provinces, and as a 
result such a plan had to be withdrawn. Provincial leaders 
had hoped that this situation would be altered after inde­
pendence, but, in fact, a higher degree of centralisation 
evolved. For example, if the constitutional machinery in a
1G, W. Choudhury, "Democracy on Trial in Pakistan," 
Middle Bast Journal, XVII {Winter-Spring, 1963), 2,
%ilcox, op. cit., p. 76,
1$
province broke down, the Governor-General through emergency 
powers was granted the authority to take over the administra­
tion of the province, ’The government of India Act divided 
legislative powers into three lists, , . . in the event of 
conflict, the federal law was to prevail.”^
The federal body, the Constituent Assembly, was 
established before partition. Members were elected by 
communal groups in the provincial assemblies, voting by 
proportional representation. The qualification for voting 
privileges varied from province to province but generally 
they were based upon education and property. As a result 
only about 15 per cent of the total population was entitled 
to vote, Each member was to represent one million inhabi­
tants, giving the Pakistan Assembly BO members. Eventually, 
when partition came, the successful candidates formed the 
Constituent Assembly.2
The First Constituent Assembly met on August 10,
1947 and elected Ali dinnah as its President, On August 15, 
Jinnah was sworn in as the first Governor-General of Pakis­
tan; shortly thereafter Liaquat All Khan became Prime Minis­
ter, On August 19, government offices commenced their 
operations.
The role of the Governor-General was intended to be
1Keith Callard, op. cit., p. 163,
2Ibid.. p. G2.
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that of a figurehead, similar to that of M s  counterpart in 
Canada and Australia* His appointment was made on the ad* 
vice of the cabinet*. If the Governor-General proved to be 
unacceptable to the cabinet, his services could be termi­
nated and a successor nominated by the cabinet* Although 
the Pakistan Provisional Constitutional Order 1947 assigned 
certain reserve powers to the Governor-General, the limits 
of his power were not clearly defined* wlt could be used 
to control a ministry, or a legislature which was violating 
the constitution, indulging in acts of wanton irresponsibility 
or flagrantly damaging the larger public interest♦"'f
Under the provisions of the Provincial Order 1947, 
the Prime Minister was undoubtedly expected to be the center 
of power* However, Mr. Jinnah, the unquestioned and power­
ful leader of the independence movement chose to continue as 
Governor-General, "As a consequence of this decision the 
normal convention of cabinet government had no chance to 
develop.Power followed Mr. Jinnah.
The members of his council of ministers felt themselves 
to be his lieutenants* They were prepared to execute 
his orders or to be overruled by him on any point, 
either individually or as a group* The possibility of 
instructions proceeding from the cabinet to the Governor- 
General did not arise; it was, in fact, unthinkable*
From the beginning, it was assumed that the normal con­
ventions of the office of Governor-General could never 
apply to Mr* Jinnah,3
11bid.. p. 130* 2Ibid*, p. 131*
3Ibid.* p. 132.
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The death of Mr* Jinnah in September 194$ made 
possible the beginning of cabinet government. Liaquat All 
Khan, the chief lieutenant of Mr. Jinnah, and the leading 
statesman in the country did not enjoy the same dominant 
position among his colleagues as had the founder of Pakis­
tan. Mr. Khan chose to remain as Prime Minister, and 
Khwajia Nazimuddin was selected as Governor-General. Unlike 
Jinnah he confined himself to the constitutional role of 
Governor-General. In 1951 All Khan was assassinated, and 
the problem of succession arose since there was no heir
apparent* The crisis was eventually resolved when Mr.
Nazimuddin vacated his position as Governor-General to be­
come Prime Minister. Ghulam Mohammad was appointed to fill 
his post. At first, Mr. Mohammad did not attempt to exceed 
his proper function, However, the continual Increase in 
political and economic problems caused the Governor-General 
to announce:
I have been driven to the conclusion that the cabinet
of Khwajia Nazimuddin has proved entirely inadequate to
grapple with the difficulties facing the country. In 
the emergency which has arisen I have felt it incumbent 
upon me to ask the cabinet to relinquish office so that 
a new cabinet better fitted to discharge its obligation 
toward Pakistan may be formed.1
The difficulties which the Governor-General spoke 
of centered around the cabinet’s inability to provide a 
constitution, resolve the food crisis which was increasing,
tIbid., p. 135.
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and the serious decline In Pakistani exports which came about 
as a result of the ending of the Korean War. Also, civil 
disorders had broken out in the Punjab and the government 
had allowed it to get out of control before they had sent 
in troops. A new cabinet was formed under the leadership of 
Mohammad All, Me, too, was unable to solve the problems 
which were besetting Pakistan, Twenty-seven months later 
the Governor-General exercised his power to declare a state 
of emergency and to dissolve the Ali cabinet. The next 
cabinet included General Ayub Khan, a soldier and General 
Mirza, a civil servant with a military background.
One of the most vexing problems facing the political 
leaders of Pakistan was that of arriving at a consensus 
about the nature and form of the government. Constitution- 
making proved to be a far more difficult task than anyone 
anticipated. For more than seven years after 1947 the 
Constituent Assembly attempted, without success, to adopt 
a constitution. There were many reasons for this failure. 
Jinnah had died in 194#, and without his leadership the 
dominant party, the Muslim League became fraught with dis­
sension.1 The desired goal of an Islamic state proved 
impossible to define in constitutional terms. Then, too, 
political rivalries arose between the eastern and western 
territories of Pakistan over a formula for determining their
1 Lawrence K. Rosinger led.), The State of Asia (lew 
York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1951)* p. 494.
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respective representations in the central assembly. The 
problems of representation of minority religious groups and 
the selection of a national language also proved to be ex­
tremely troublesome. The inability of the Assembly to 
resolve these issues led Governor-General Mohammad to dis­
miss not only the cabinet in 1954* but also the Constituent 
Assembly.
The second Constituent Assembly was elected in dune
1955* More success attended its efforts* for within a year
it was able to draft a constitution that was acceptable to
a majority of the Assembly members. It was, however?
... a document of despair. The Prime Minister 
(Chaudhri Mahammad Ali) was so anxious to go down in 
history as the author of the Constitution that he was 
prepared to accommodate all points of view. What the 
country got was not a Constitution but a hotch-potch 
of alien concepts which had already brought enough con­
fusion and chaos to the country. The Constitution* by 
distributing power between the President* the Prime 
Minister and his cabinet* and the provinces, destroyed 
the focal point of power and left no one in a position 
of control.1
The promulgation of the constitution in 1956 did 
not eliminate the political intrigues and corruption which 
the Assembly members practiced. Votes in the Assembly were 
bought and sold with such frequency that it was difficult to 
Identify individuals with any party* If an Assembly member 
was bribed he would completely ignore the opinion of his 
party and vote as he had been bribed to do. Nepotism was
1Ayub Khan, Friends hot Masters, op. cit.s p. 50.
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widely practiced as was the bribing of electors during 
political campaigns. Civic responsibilities were discarded 
for private aims. Eventually the political situation deter­
iorated to such a point that Assembly members were using 
physical rather than verbal exertions to express their 
opinions. The Speaker of the Legislative Assembly in last 
Pakistan, for example, was manhandled and chased from the 
House. A few days later the Deputy Speaker was beaten to 
death during another Assembly incident.**
The political process deteriorated to such an extent 
that on October 7, 195$, President Miraa issued a procla­
mation abrogating the constitution and 1956 Martial Law was 
declared. All cabinets and representative assemblies, both 
provincial and national were dissolved as were all political 
parties. The president appointed General Mohammad Ayub Khan, 
commander-in-chief of the army, as martial law administrator 
and supreme commander of the armed forces. He justified his 
actions in the following terms:
For the last two years I have been watching with 
deepest anxiety the ruthless struggle for power, corrup­
tion, the shameful exploitation of our simple, honest, 
patriotic and industrious masses, the lack of decorum 
and the prostitution of Islam for political ends. , . . 
The despicable activities have led to a dictatorship of 
the lowest order* Adventurers and exploiters have 
flourished to the detriment of the masses and are get­
ting richer by their nefarious practices.
1Shalid All Eizvi, "Local Bodies in Pakistan," 
Pakistan .Quarterly (Winter, 1966), p. 56.
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The mentality of the political parties has sunk so 
low that I am un&hl© any longer to believe that elec­
tions will improve the present chaotic internal situa­
tion and enable us to form a strong and stable govern­
ment capable of dealing with innumerable and complex 
problems facing us today.1
There was no violence. On the following day General 
Mohammad Khan* in a radio address , told the nation that he 
had accepted the assignment with great reluctance in the 
belief that the only other alternative was chaos and col­
lapse. The army, he said, had always kept vseverely aloof 
from politics* . . . Our ultimate aim is to restore democ­
racy but of the type that our people can understand and 
work.*2
On October 24 President Mirza named General Mohammad 
Ayub Khan as Prime Minister to form a new twelve-man cabinet. 
Three days later Mirssa himself was removed from office and 
forced to hand over all powers to the General, who then 
assumed the title of president. The new executive announced 
that martial law would continue in order to give "legal 
cover for certain reforms we want to put through."3 He 
indicated that he intended to press for increased food 
production, land reforms, and a simplified legal system.
The post of Prime Minister was abolished. The commanders-
1New Tork Times. October $, 195®, p» 1.
%ew York Times. October 9, 195&, p. 5*
3Hew York Times. October 31> 195&0 p. 1.
la-chief of the three military services (army, navy, air 
force) were designated Deputy Chief Martial Law Administra­
tors* Other senior military officers were appointed to head 
up martial law administration in each of the three toness 
Kanaehi, last Pakistan, and West Pakistan*
Clearly, military rule had begun* The new president 
found it expedient, however, to make as few changes in 
government administration as possible* He announced that 
the abrogates would be followed in the absence of directives 
to the contrary* The regular courts were to continue to 
function, but no court writs against martial law administra­
tors or their orders would be allowed* This restriction, of 
course, nullified a good deal of the courts* power*
The new presidents cabinet contained three generals, 
three civil servants, and five lawyers. All were college 
graduates who had traveled, widely and many had graduate 
degrees| a majority had studied in England* With one or two 
possible exceptions, they were well qualified by training 
and experience for the administrative responsibilities 
assigned to them. All had achieved a degree of prominence 
in India prior to partition. Only four were from East Pakis­
tan. Two (both of them lawyers from last Pakistan) were 
experienced in politics. Hot one could be described as a 
businessman or industrialistj only one had served with the 
Civil Service of Pakistan as a prominent minister, and none
was a major landlord*1
Land reforms, the elimination of income tax evasion 
and black marketing, and the elimination of corruption among 
governmental officials received top priority under the new 
regime* Within months of taking office the president an­
nounced that no person would be allowed to own more than 500 
acres of irrigated or 1,000 acres of unirrigated land In 
West Pakistan, and promised that the large landlords, some
6.000 of them, would be compensated for their losses*  ̂ After 
the president threatened to prosecute all who failed to 
report their Income in accordance with the income tax laws, 
previously unreported income in excess of a billion rupees 
was disclosed*3 Several politicians and businessmen were 
prosecuted for black marketing; the most noteworthy case 
Involved Mr* M« A. Ihuhro, a former Minister of Defense,
who was sentenced to five years imprisonment and fined
150.000 rupees on a charge of illegally selling a new auto­
mobile*^
Commissions were set up to study and recommend 
reforms in the fields of education and law* Educational
1 Khalid B« Sayeed, nMartial Law Administration in 
Pakistan,” Far Eastern Survey, XOTI1 (1959), 73-74*
^Pakistan Hews Digest« February 1, 1959.
3Ibid* * July 1, 1959*
4Goodnow, op. cit.* pp. 254-55*
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standards, in the president’s view, needed to be raised 
and oriented more toward the country’s need for technicians, 
professional personnel, and administrators. Recommendations 
along such lines were published and reforms were urged to 
provide educational opportunity on the basis of ability and 
aptitude rather than the financial standing of the parents.
The press was subjected to censorship. Martial law 
regulations prohibited the organization, convening, or 
attending of any political meeting or gathering. The presi­
dent reiterated many times, however, that all of his actions 
were taken for the sole purpose of molding the kind of social 
environment in which democracy could function successfully; 
the country needed to be rescued from the chaos into which 
it had been plunged by unscrupulous politicians, MThere has 
been no limit to the depth of their baseness* chicanery, 
deceit, and degradation,1* *
The president’s stated aim was to use the armed 
forces for civil purposes as seldom as possible. He asked 
the civilian agencies to discharge their duties honestly, 
justly, and faithfully. This was their opportunity to show 
their full worth, since for once there would be no politi­
cians about to interfere,
Ayub Khan made it clear that he would tolerate no
1Statement broadcast by Radio Pakistan, October S, 
195$, Pakistan Embassy of Pakistan, Washington D.C., H.O.
2 0
opposition, that he had assumed complete lawmaking control, 
and that he would not hesitate to curtail civil liberties 
whenever his program seemed to demand it. At the same time 
he indicated that he did not wish to go beyond the dictates 
of necessity and that he ultimately wanted to return to 
constitutional government,^
1 Ayub Khan, Friends, fgt Masters., o&. p. 01.
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provided that the president should seek the advise of the 
cabinet in choosing a prime minister# he was not hound to 
do so or to heed the advice*
When there was one political party or a cohesive 
coalition of parties with a clear majority in the National 
Assembly t the president appointed its leader as prime 
minister and responded to the advice of the cabinet.* Af* 
ter 1954 there was- no stable political party of coalition 
and the real power rested with the president# who could 
always remove an uncooperative prime minister* 1 The «*ar» 
else of strong political leadership by the president .in 
Pakistan had its precedence in the rule of the British 
Oovernors-General and by Ifofcanaad All Jiimah, Pakistanis 
first Governor»Gcneral*2
However# the chief executive is dependent on the 
cooperation of the civil and military services* Since 1951# 
the offices of Governor *»Gene ra 1 and president have been 
filled either by an ©x~civil servant or by a military ®m*$ 
traditionally he does not sit idly about while politicians 
Interfere in the administrative structures and the policies 
of the government* Furthermore# there Is no precedent in
*For example# Suhrawardy's removal in 1957*
Mallard# £g:* cit*» p* 20* 
iGoodnow j op* cit* * p* 75*
3!
the history of Pakistan for a chief's executive power being 
made accountable to elected representatives or even to public 
opinion*
frm the downfall of t&rca in 195 fi to 1960* there 
was no constitutional president* During this period# power 
was concentrated in the hands of Khan.# Chief Martial law 
Administrator 0 Seeking to achieve a measure of popular 
support for his regime # he cast about for a device by which 
scat measure of democracy could be safely introduced without 
destroying his own power or endangering his position* Be
finally came up with the system known as Basic Democracy*
✓
.Basie -Democracies and the 1962 Constitution
In Shan*® opinion there were four prerequisites 
which were essential to the successful functioning of democ­
racy in a developing country# the form of democracy should 
be simple to understand*, easy to work * and cheap to sustain* 
It should put to the voter only such questions as he could 
answer In the light of his personal knowledge*. It should 
ensure the effective .participation of ©11 eit 1 sens, and it 
should be able to produce reasonably strong, and stable gov­
ernment ̂
His Basle Democracy system, he thought* would permit
1 Mohammad Ayub Khan* ^Pakistan Perspective,’1 Foreign 
Affairs (Duly# 1960)* p« 547*
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the illiterate villagers to meet with and judge the integ­
rity of the candidates lor office a*1 Hopefully# this would 
eliminate mass voting for candidates with indefinite .poli­
cies and eliminate such of the intimidation that had heon 
prevalent* Under his system# representatives of small 
village® could meet directly with administrative officials 
on four levels of government,2 People and government would 
cooperate in shaping domestic policies and in planning for 
improvement In socio-economic conditions^
the four levels# or tiers as they were called# on 
an ascending scale m m  the village Union Councils t the 
fefisii {Mast Pakistan) and Than® {Hast Pakistan) Councils# 
the District Councils, and the Divisional Councils* 111 
of these councils were to cooperate with a Provisional 
Development Advisory Council which would advise the pro­
vincial governments 0 In addition to certain assigned func­
tions# each level had supervisory and coordinating powers 
over the lower tiers#3
the Union Councils had# in addition to such respon­
sibilities as were assigned to it by the government and the 
District Councils# authority to try petty crimes# institute
lOoodnow# eg, eft* * p» 260*
2Ay»b Khan, MftHflff. & £  l82SflES» £22" £&'» P= 2°8.
3Basic jMwaraalM (Bureau of Satlonal Reconstrue-
tion# Government of Pakistan# n«d»), pp* 13*17*
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public works8 run health and literacy centers* plan sanitary 
measures and form agricultural cooperatives,'*
Second tier Tehsil/fhana Councils had mainly coordi­
nating .functions* The District Council1a jurisdiction «*» 
tended to elementary schools* medical facilities* recreation 
and community development s and traffic regulation* They 
could tax and allocate funds. In Khan^ plan they were the 
has# from which his government policies could he implemented*2 
The highest level* the Divisional Councils* had 
similar powers over a much larger area and also served as a 
grievance committee for complaints against the government-J 
The implementation of the three upper tiers was con- 
ti&gent upon the election and establishment of the Onion 
Councils * the unit most basic to the entire system*■
The membership of each of the three levels above the 
Onion Councils was made up of the chairman of the tier 
immediately below it and m  equal number of m m  appointed 
fey the government*
Union Councils at the outset consisted of two-thirds 
elected members and one-third appointed- members* usually
1 Mohammad Iqufeai Choudhry and &ushtaq Ahmed Khan* 
M M m l .  &9SMM, (Peshawar! Moorsoms* 19641* P« W *
2Masihua-2aman» "How Pakistan is Governedsn Pakistan 
.Quarterly* XIII (Autumn-Winter* 1964)* 123*
3Ibid,
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government officials* la the formation of the Union Council 
it was a general aim that there should ha a representative 
of minority groups such as agricultural laborers and women, 
and that at least one or two of the members were literate
In preparation for elections within the Sasic Democ­
racies scheme, President Khan, in December 1959# lifted the 
ban on political meetings and undertook a tour of Pakistan 
to acquaint the people with his m m  plan, the ©lections 
held on December 2d, 1959, were for the purpose of choosing 
the Basic Democrats, that is, those for the Union Councils*
To qualify for ©lection a candidate had to be twenty-five 
years of age, on the electoral role of his constituency, and 
be solvent, He could not qualify if he had a prison record 
of more than si*, months* or if he wm  a government employee,^ 
The UO,000 constituencies (40,000 in each of the provinces} 
each .had a voting population of 1,000 to 1,500, end each 
constituency would elect on© Basic Democrat, Once elected, 
the Basic Democrat, together with those of neighboring dis­
tricts would take his place on the Union Council of his 
area*
The results of the ©lections were not announced 
until the middle of February, 1960* A breakdown of the votes
1M mM  M m m m S m *  m «  m$&°* p° 24*
2Choudhry and Khan, ££* ©ft*» pp* 105-06*
east showed that a greater percentage of rural voters exer­
cised their franchise than did urban dwellers#1 the turnouts 
of women voters was greater than expected* About 4 per cent 
of the eligible women voted m  compared with 6? per cent of 
the meit*3
In M s  analysis of the first election to the Union 
Councils, Sayeed suggests that "Basic Democracies seem to 
have attracted more attention among less sophisticated voters 
than those la urban areas where the demand for the restore** 
tion of parliamentary democracy has been persistent**^ This 
seems natural since the Union Councils were basically town 
bodies* Sayeed. also argues that voters have been attracted 
to the novelty of Basic Democracies, the promises of the 
regime that the Basic Democrats would be effectively involved 
in the exciting process of improving their lot in life# and 
above all, they were attracted by the personality of Aywb 
Khan*
The successful candidates represented a cross section 
of the population# Sayeed cites government figures^ to show 
the following categories! 48,99$ farmers, 222 lawyers, 2,586
%ahlid a* Sayeed, "Pakistan’s Basie Democracies 
Middle East Journal (Summer, 1961), p* 256*
2Ayufe Khan, "Pakistan Perspective," jjj>* eit** p« $52*
3Sayeed, "Pakistan’s Basic Democracies," og# eit*,
P* 256*
4IMd* , pp* 256«2$2*
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small businessmen, 391 ex-government servants, and 10 jour­
nalist s* fha remainder were drawn fro® the artisan. class*
In spite of government efforts to keep the election 
as non-political as possible , there were signs of political, 
latimidatioa in the form of unopposed candidacies* Consid­
erable numbers of former politician* competed successfully* 
and about 0 per cent of the total, membership of the Union 
Councils were from this element of the populationo
the election results m m  to. indicate that a respect- 
able amber of Pakistanis identified with the regime and its 
plans for Pakistan0
the newly elected Union Council* soon, gave Khan the 
popular- support he had been seeking by extending to hi® a 
vote of confidence* At the .same time they requested hi® to 
take steps to initiate constitutional government m m  nor** 
Immediately .following the election of the Basic 
Democrats, Ayub Khan announced the creation of a Constitu­
tion Commission* It was headed by a member of the Supreme 
Court and consisted of five members fro© both East and West 
Pakistan# the Commission members were charged with the 
following' tasks
I* To examine the *progressive failure of parlia­
mentary government in Pakistan leading to the abrogation 
of the Constitution of 19$6, and to recommend how a 
recurrence of similar cases can be prevented.*®
II* To submit proposals for a Constitution, taking 
Into consideration the *genius of the people,® the
3?
general standard of education and. political judgement 
in the country, the present state of nationhood, the 
need for sustained development, and the effect of con­
stitutional and administrative change© in recent month©#
3* the study would ©mho# recommendation© as to 
how best the following ends could be achieved! (i) a 
democracy ''adaptable to changed circumstances and based 
on the Islamic principles of Justice, equality, and 
tolerance** f {ill consolidation of national unity j and 
{ill} a fins and stable goverimtejit,»
Khan claimed that he would **accept the Commission*s recom­
mendations even if they were different from, my ideas provided 
they are better than mine and good for the country..”2
A report m  the Commissionf» findings were presented 
to Khan on May 6, 1961* Several disagreements between Khan 
and the Commission were resolved in Khan * © favor# The Coo* 
mission had recommended a bicameral legislature! a vice- 
president with some powers, from the other province from 
which the president came; direct elections on the basis of 
restricted adult franchise^ and separate electors# Khan 
accepted.the Commission*s suggestions regarding a presiden­
tial form of government* the federal structure, and a focal 
point of power, however, he rejected the Commission's 
advocacy of a bicameral legislature and a vice-president#
^Ayub Khan* Friends Hot Masters, sit** pp# 210-
211 *
aiblriU, p. 212#
^Voting privileges were only to be extended to those 
individual© who could comprehend the significance of a politi­
cal election. This criteria for- voting continued to be a 
controversial point among political groups*
It
The irrnmMm was left to the legislature which
decided in 1964 to hate the Sasic Democrats serve as m  
Electoral College to elect the national m i  provincial 
assemblies and the president#
Khan stated the reasons for his disagreement with 
the Comalsalon's reeeaaieudiitieita of a vice-presidents Be 
argued that a vice-president, being the representative of 
the other region or provinces would only complicate matters 
by dividing rather thaw uniting the two reilons of the 
country* Be rejected the Commission's recommendation that 
the president delegate power to the vice«* prosldent* Khan 
deemed it necessary that the president have the complete 
political picture before hi® as he was the individual who 
would be responsible for all major decisions# Be also felt 
that the position of vice-president would, * inevitably# 
create east-west controversies and set up factions within 
the Presidential cabinet itself#** In addition, if a strong 
presidential candidate were coupled with a weak vice-* 
presidential candidate, the elective judgement would be 
confuted# Khan also opposed a vice-presidency on the 
grounds that a president should rely on his status and Image 
to gain country wide support as a national figure and not 
be dependent on the graces and support of a figure from
p. 2l6o
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mother region#**
thm presented a recommendation to alleviate a 
power vacuum upon the mhmme or death of a president.# So 
proposed that* if the president were from one region* then 
the Speaker of the National assembly should represent 'the 
other region*^
Presidential power on financial matters m e  also 
settled.# After Khan voiced his disagreement* a plan m m  
adopted to minimise the causes for conflict between the 
president .and the legislature# For- example* a budget with - 
two parts was adopted* One part covered expenditures for 
the administration and for continuing expenditures or doveJU 
opteut programs- carried from the previous year? the other 
part m m  to cover all m m  items of expenditure# Seductions 
in the expenditures of the first part would require the 
consent of the president and any alterations in the second 
part would require a vote by the legislature#3
In Its draft* the Constitution commission also pro- 
tided for the impeachment of the president* governors* 
ministers * chief Justices* and Judges of the Supreme Court# 
the president could hr impeached, for gross misconduct or 
willful violation of the. Constitution on a motion of a one*
11bid#, p. 215#
Slb&d.. p# 21d*
3lrticl.es 144 and 145* 1962* Pakistan Constitution#
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third of the elected ©embers of the legislature. The presi­
dent could be removed from his office if he were found 
guilty by three-quarters of the total members of the legis­
lature. However, in order to prevent undue exploitation of 
motions for impeachment, a resolution was adopted whereby 
if less than one-half of the votes in the National Assembly 
were in favor of impeachment* then the movers of the motion 
would lose their seats in the Assembly.̂
Bills and amendments to the Constitution were also 
discussed by the Constitution Commission. An amendment of 
the Constitution would require the approval of the president 
and a two-thirds majority. If the president vetoed an amend­
ment* then the amendment would be sent bach to the legisla­
ture where a three-quarter majority vote could overrule the 
presidential veto. In the extreme case of a president again 
refusing to sign an amendment, the president could resort 
to submitting the amendment to a referendum by the entire 
Ileetoral College who could then decide whether or not the 
measure should be passed*2
Bills to amend the Constitution that would have the 
effect of changing the boundaries of a province could not 
be passed by the National Assembly unless concurred by a
* Articles 13 and 14* 1962 Pakistan Constitution.
2Articles 24, 2?* and 209, 1962 Pakistan Constitu­
tion.
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two-*bhirds majority vote of the province concerned* *
After considerable discussion about these and other
features* the legislature and the president reached agrees
aent of the terns of the Constitution and the document was
promulgated on January 3* 1962*
tinder the terns of the Constitution* the legislature
of Pakistan would consist of one house in which each of the
two provinces would have equal representation• Hie total
membership of the assembly was fixed at 1$60 Each province
has 75 members* the additional six are reserved for women
from the two provinces*
The Constitution is heavily executively*>oriantede
iupba describes it in the following words*2
The present constitution in Pakistan, has a large 
degree of authoritarianism inherent in it® provisions* 
The powers of the President art enormous and It ha© 
been .maintained by various political elements that It 
is very much short of a democratic constitution* The 
denial of adult franchise to the people and the system 
of indirect elections$ the inadequate application of 
the principle of separation of power and particularly 
the restraints of the judiciary* the facts that funds** 
mental right® have been made non**justiciable and the 
difficulties la amending, the Constitution are among 
the various feature® which have .made many Pakistanis 
feel, that nthis constitution only puts a new garb m  
Martial Law* All the despotic powers which are held 
by the Chief Martial lew Administrator had now been 
carefully but cunningly vested in the President**
* Article 74 , 1962 Pakistan Constitution*
%lsir t» Oupta, "Political Issues and. Political 
forces in Pakistan,” M E&rM&m Ii£ii M M M *  CMsrch* i¥o4i* 57*
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fit© formulation of policy occurs in the president *a 
%mlYe**mn cabinet and in his appointed secretariate Each 
ministry s of cow®#*, has a mini star and a permanent secre­
tary , responsible for policy consideration in the area of 
their jurisdiction,,*
the laws of Pakistan are applied and executed by the 
bureaucracy which will he considered later.
In the %$&% ©eoatibubiofi arrangement, the provincial 
governments are given a degree of autonomy? providing they 
keep within the limit of policies set down by the central 
administration, T® minimise the chance of conflicting 
policies, the provincial governor is appointed by the prosi- 
dent, fils ministers are also appointed with presidential 
approval,
T® ensure national unity within the federal system,
the national Assembly stay legislate in areas reserved to
the 'province*' when it is in the national' interest to do a®.
It may do so in matters relating to:
1« The security of Pakistan, including the economic 
and financial stability of Pakistani
2« planning or coordination; or
.3# the achievement of uniformity in respect of any 
matter in different parts of Pakistani so requires, the 
Central legislature shall have the pmmr to make laws 
(including laws having extra-territorial operation I for
?3, Amjad All| *8,000 Moral Kepublica,* Pakistan. 
Quarterly, 1111 (Autumn and liftter* 1904), 94*
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the whole or any pert of Pakistan with respect to any 
matter not m i r t U d  in the third Schedule#1
the priaetf&m of national supremacy prevails in the event of
A conflict between national and provincial law*
Reports on the success of the first step Is the
mtehliehment of Basle Democracies* the Union Councils*
vary considerably,, Bose analysts*, for example* dismiss
the® as powerless entities*^
this judgement, rests partly on Section 74 of the
Sasic Democracies Order which states that;
If* in the opinion of the Controlling: Authority* any« 
thing is done or intended to be done by or on behalf of
a local council is not in conformity with the law* or 
iy way ty may,
(a) Quail"the proceedings*
« v v im ik x x u v u x u w n x  v im x u  x\*u v*w xmm* m r
is in an against public interest* the Controlling
t any
or order made by the local council;
n
Authorit * by orders 
l sh ed
lb) suspend the execution of  resolution passed
Co) prohibit the doing of anything proposed to be done;
Id) require the local council to take such action 
a# nay be specified#!
the Order also provides that a Union Council might be
displaced If they wars not functioning efficiently or haw
acted In a maimer contrary to public interest# **4
* M a t i £$• sli,** p* 123*
%* Amjad All* £&* pit## p# 122* Goodnow* £g, pit#» 
p# 2&2* Be® also Gupta* £g« eft#* p# 52#
%)ie .1nt|c. ̂leapcrapiea. gate* .Bmjasette. $JL MsOs&Sr 
►aoSinary (let#3 7 * Sited -'in... bin fSt# jy* *v?v/rFF* ffr^r^p ......................U M I  C^ isyeei* ^Pakistan1! Basic .Democracy** illjiilp ggufe 
Journal (Swisr, 1961), p, 254.
^Sayeed, "Pakistan*® Basie Dacocraeyw. ctt..
P# 254*
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the m m  sophisticated middle class sad urban fe«U* 
ers were frustrated by the restrictions- imposed by lasie 
Democracies * they wished- to have m  direct a vote as they 
had enjoyed under the parliamentary system* It was this, 
section of the population which favored a return of politic 
c&l partiess end the accompanying vital Involvement*1
The important fact to 'hear in mind B however# is 
that the system of Basic Democracies was'created to arouse 
a politically apathetic mass of illiterate peasants* the 
process of involvement was to he a gradual ono$ Khan mt*» 
tainly did mot Intend that mens whose sphere of interest 
extended little further than the local villages should be 
able to exert considerable pressure on important domestic 
issues*
Khan envisaged a stable form of politics in which 
socio-economic conditions Improved at an impressive rate*
M  those conditions improved# so would the level of democracy* 
Thus, in the first stag# of development of democratic pro* 
cess# the masses were to- learn to take Initiative at the 
local level* They were expected to assume minor responsi­
bilities # plan future development# and organise coopera* 
tlves*2 Elementary exercises la the execution of community
1 The Time# /tbndoh7a December It# 19&4# p* %
•'*3* Atajad All# alt* * p. 122*
45
betterment* it was hoped, would generate self-confidence*
In spite of the drawbacks, ease positive benefits 
did flow from tbs Union Councils of Basic Democracies,, They 
linked local government to bfi# formal administrative appars* 
bus*1 fhay offers training in, leadership- skills and stimu­
lated self-help concepts*^ they helped, reduce the tradi­
tional distrust of. the bureaucracy held by the masses«3 
they subjected, officials to the scrutiny of elected rapra* 
they provided am institutional framework 
within which .specified tasks could be discharged^ they 
coordinated .public, works and assisted la determining tins 
availability of technical advice/* 4 tratolmg course to 
rules of procedure sad the conduct of .public discussion 
helped the Basic Democrat identify with the system A 
compulsory course was instituted in public relations for 
all officials connected with the system*? Finally* by 
including members of minority groups* women* for essample* 
a more representative system was achieved**
9 flw"̂ ii<>iiwpw><ei»<(www;wjirsi wigji mtrnimmtm*.
1L* F« Hushbrock Williams * "Basic Benottraeiea m
Institutions of local Government In Pakistan-IX** Journal
9 1  hmMl m m m m & m  M m m & *  n  imzi* m .
*>• 250* 3Ibid** p. 250*
% *  4mjad 411 * og0 P* 120*. ?Xbld»» p* 120*
^Lawrence Siring9 "'Pakistan then and How* last and 
West,* lain (3prtog* 1w)» P»
?B* P, Eusfebrook Williams* gg* cit«. p« 106,
^Choudhry and Khan* ©g* pit*. p* 106*
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Since- its inception in 1960, some changes hair# taken 
plate in Basie Democracies, Union Council statue' was in** 
creased when Khan designated that tier as an electoral body 
for president and national and provincial assemblies*
Another change occurred when nominated and appointed 
members were eliminated from the first and second tiers# At 
the third and fourth levels, the ratio of elected to appoin­
ted members is still, equal#
The power of the Union Chairman in bh® structure has 
been diluted# A vice-chairman has been elected and certain 
duties have been delegated to him. The Union-Cbainnan Is 
now liable for di aqual if lea t ion when a two-third.® majority 
of the Council are dissatisfied with the manner in which he 
executes his responsibilities*'*
Elected vice-chairmen have also b&m introduced Into 
the District Councils# This has removed some of the power 
wielded by % he government official,, the Deputy Commissioner 
who was chairman of the District Council# However, should 
the elected vice-chairman, neglect, the responsibilities of 
his position, ho, too, any be deposed by a two-thirds 
majority vote of no-eonfidenoe#^
In November, 1961, a Rural larks Program, was imple­
mented and within two years the District -and Union Council®
*3# Amjad All, eft## p. 121#
%XMd* * p. 123#
4?
were directly responsible for the planning and construction 
of nnation building” projects. This included such items 
asI schoolst land reclamation# small irrigation schemes„ 
low cost housing# and feeder roads. In 1963*64* a total of 
Hs300 million was allocated to the program. Of this amountj 
BfltlOO ©illion was spent directly by the Onion CouncilsJ
Although Khan was conscious of demands to introduce 
a greater degree of democracy in his regime# he was not 
willing to share his power to the extent that he would lose- 
control of the power structure. He was willing to search 
for a formula# however, and for the system as a whole# cane 
up with the device of Basic democracies# basically ah 
scheme.
Introducing any serious element of democracy within 
his regime proper was another matter* Parliamentary govern* 
'Beat had been tried in Pakistan# but It had failed* Am a 
form of government it was perhaps unsuited to the .political 
realities of Pakistani political Immaturity and lack of 
political experience in the sophisticated art of compromise 
and party politics* The masses of people were unable to 
participate effectively because of poor communication and 
their low literacy level* The parliamentary system was 
adopted at the outset simply because it was the only form
U faM., p, 123,
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of democracy with which the people m m  f»lllar*
Familiarity, however, does mot ensure success* Tern 
years of malfunction, corruption, and ineffectual perform*- 
ante# particularly in the failure to produce a. constitution, 
point to the inadequacy of the system* It was terminated 
by lhamss coup*
11a mew constitution, reflects his concern with a 
possible repetition of the record.of the first tern years of 
Pakistanis independence* Is am authoritarian, t&ilitary 
president, he simply could not tolerate a return to the 
chaotic conditions of the earlier period* the legislature * 
therefore, was placed in & decidedly inferior position In 
the regime, as m m  the courts*
Khan was able to manipulate the destiny of Pakistan, 
not only because of his charismatic qualities, but also be* 
cause he lad a fir® power base in. the military forces* The 
role of the military will be the subject of the next 
chapter*
CHAPTER If
fllE KOI! OF THS JfXUTART I» THE
MoosRHmnoH effort
In certain states such m  Indonesia and Jordan, the
military and political systems have a symbiotic relationship#
In other states., the two systems function apart* When the
status quo changes, the observer la able to observe certain
changes in the power structure bteatte* there has been m
alteration in the guiding principles of the ruling system*
This particular section, is concerned with the changes that
occur when there is martial intrusion into civilian politics*
It will also take note &t the process of Involvement until
the time that the military has established itself a# an
oligarchic force#
the motives of a military revolution may be .gauged
by eaeu&ial&g the conditions in a society that enabled the
military to become a major political force* In. many of the
states created after World far II, the military intrusion
Into the polities took place because there
is evidence that there are •weaknesses in them /the 
statejy which are not compensated by those political 
institutions which were inherited or established at 
the moment of independence* these political institu- 
tions were mainly parliamentary! more or less demo­
cratic* and liberal# Military rule la one of several
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practicable and apparently stable alternatives when 
parliamentary, democratic regimes falter,,1
When the inherited political Institution* proved 
ineiieetive end a. vacuum has been created in leadership, 
the military can. be drawn in to fill the role of decision­
maker, partly through patriotism, which may veil the true 
motive® of a coup dfetat* Patriotism is a necessary emotion 
for the esprit 4s corps and loyalty of m  array,. Therefores 
when national security is at stake, even though the peril 
may emanate internally, a well-disciplined, efficient, and 
loyal army feels n& sense of national .mission transcending 
parochial, regional, or economic interests# or kinship 
ties#**2
On# cannot diasies# however# the personal .interest© 
which m y  be disguised as patriotism# Within the armed 
forces of a country the interests of the senior officers# 
and. the remainder of the recruit# may be different# The 
latter are concerned with "economic and social matters, the 
most important of these being wage increases# security of 
pensions# ©ecurement of lucrative office# in the bureaucracy#
?Edward Shils# wThe Military in the Political 
Development of the lew States *# The, hi" * '* ‘
-_—  -r-.—  -  -- j* edited by John 77 Johnson' IPrince-bom Pi^neeton ''university Press# 19&2}, p# %
%anfred Hal pern, "Middle Eastern kttdmn and the 
Hew Middle Class," The Role of ,the ‘
Countries * on# cit# # p# 296*
II
and, at times , security anti, special favors for their fami­
lies*®*
the interests of the senior officers, m  the other 
hand, often extended beyond the reals of personal ©coiiomlc 
security* Already an elite within an elite, they war® 4 m m  
towards political involvement and thereby to an extension 
of their power* Eisenstadt points to four stages in which 
the military aim to usurp power*
1* Political influence through- the appropriation 
of advisory and bureaucratic positions*
2* the concentration of political power*
3* ffee control of the ruling elite*
&« Seizure of realm and rule*2
On every occasion of military intervention Into 
politics,-- the degree of involvement varies, as does the 
intent* In Latin America, for exawpie, the military govern­
ments have been characterised by ̂ administrative incompetence, 
inaction, and authoritarian, if sot reactionary values 
In more recent time® and in a more widely universal aspect, 
wth@ military involvement has been that of a dynamic and 
as If-saerificing leadership committed to- progress and the
%* 1* Biaeasbadt, fhg foMticsl Systemp, of £g& Jg* 
sires (Londons Goiiler«lfemlIaii £55-* , vSwgtT* p* Wl«
told** p* 172*
liucian V, Py®, Aspects o£ Political toeloiaiinb. 
(Bostons Little, Brown, and Co*, TtqoI, p* i/j*
mm
i
i
'When compelled to at®Is outside their society 'tor -a model 
of development* th# military leaitri become acutely aware 
of the needs of modernisation and technological advaoeaawat«3 
Therefore, their training baa emphasized the need for tech-
I § ia»ftt&t t toajaJf %&IuJ1%sM* ImHa*r4«0 *41 it& s1Ism&Ii«5a•H **4©aii01|S*as§•©o!§§ II4» *!8 IJ* I 33a 1 3 «* ©§*■IIu< aIwtz*■ 3S IS | 1*> a +>« K a! 1 l
«612Oft.
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the elite is replace*! by that of another and a new power 
base is rapidly established in order that the new elite*© 
position may be solidified,,
The Immediate effect of military intrusion into 
civilian politics are readily visible * .particularly when the 
military M s  taken over fro© inefficient .politicians# Con­
stitutional forms of government are abrogated# 'this includes 
the outlawing of political parties* and the "ordinary organs 
Of .public ©pinion are forced Into a state of attrition#"^
The enforcement of law and order and the elimination of 
political corruption are readily achieved by a military 
power#2
The show of maintaining order and reducing corruption 
helps the regime to garner popular- support* and it is through 
this means* rather than, ideological dogma, that a military 
government initially wins favor* It cannot win total accept- 
aacs because the ousted elite cannot be placated nor m m  all 
sections of society become mobilized because "traditional 
attachments are tremendously resilient#1’! These pockets of 
potential opposition cause the military to become more 
authoritarian and eventually to assume complete control* By 
its very nature* a military force looks upon "dispersed 
authority as intolerable#1̂
’M i * . P. 55. zIMi.» P- 55. 
4H M « »  p. 5*.
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Mo matter how strongly a unitary government feels 
it must not dilate or share power; political systems repairs 
the services of an experienced administrative bureaucracy; 
%v©n though it denounces* purges, and transforms it, the 
elite will eventually be forced into a coalition -with the 
civil service**^ furthermore. If comparative stability is 
established, and there is order within the nation, the 
military must begin to formulate a program of social and 
economic Improvement to retain their popular has© of support* 
this requires the assistance of the civil service, for it 
1® the administrative bureaucracy which implements new pro­
grams 0
throughout SMls1 discussion of the military role 
in a political system.# he m m  the word wcar©taking^ He 
describes the military oligarchy as directionless and argues 
that they have %o definite conception of the kind of regime 
to which- they wish to transfer power or toward which they 
wish to move 01,2
In the ensuing discussion of the military .in Pakistan, 
it will become evident that certain aspects of the regime 
are In accord with the theoretical framework* Other aspects 
are not compatible because the- .human, element, in this case 
•the administrator of the oligarchy,, places their_ own limita­
tions on that pattern*
. ■ >
11bid.. p. 57. 2lbl<t.. $>» 59.
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Gf the elite groups to Pakistan* the military has. 
experienced the shortest existence a® a unified body* though 
Moslems had served as members of the British Indian Army for 
more than %m  hundred years., there was not, at the time Of 
partition, a single .separate Muslim combatant unit* The 
British had purposely subscribed to this polity following 
the Sepoy Mutiny of 165? in which the Muslim soldiers re* 
volted against their British officers* Fro® this point on ■ 
Muslims were dispersed throughout the Indian. Army to proper** 
tions that - prevented the® fro® becoming the dominant group 
to a unit.
Initially, it was the aim of the Brit toll to have 
the' Indian. Army intact for the first five years of Indian 
and Pakistani independence* It was felt that such a pro* 
cedure would increase the efficiency with which troops could 
be serrated, toe Hindus agreed to this plan, but the Stas** 
lias vehemently opposed it and as a'result the separation of 
the British Indian Army was .moved up to April 1, 1946, At 
the time of partition, Muslim military forces were estimated 
at 150,000 officers and men, all of who® were scattered 
throughout the subcontinent#
The officers and sen returning to the Muslim regions 
formed a disorganised and uaderaraed military force# tinder 
the terms of the partition agreement, arms left by the 
vacating British forces were to be divided proportionally
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between the t m  countries« However, as the majority of 
supply depot# m m  located in what was m w  Indian territory, 
the Ntwlittd did not receive what they considered was their 
proper allotment* The reluctance of the Indian government 
to distribute .arms to Pakistani force# rest## primarily upon 
the fact that seen after partition m  armed conflict arose 
between India and Pakistan over the territory of Kashmir* 
to complicate the organization of the army, there 
was a shortage of. officers* It had been the policy of the 
British to appoint to the major ranks, persons of British 
origin in order to prevent a *nativ** from eoMaadiag a 
.military wit* Since the Muslims m m  trusted less than 
the Hindu#, there were naturally fewer Muslims holding the 
rank of officer than either the British or Hindus*
Disorganized, understaffed, and badly supplied as 
it was, the Army was still entrusted with a wide variety 
ef duties* It was called upon to fill the depleted rank# 
of the civil service, maintain law sad order, protect the 
refugee movement sad administer to the refugees fro®.India 
and to defend the ill»defined borders against raids* These 
were difficult- tasks to beqimth to any group, but the Army 
responded well to the challenge and as a result became the 
recipient of praise*
The adulation bestowed upon the military was at 
first confined primarily to the Western wing of Pakistan*
57
The major recruiting are# for the British Indian Army .had 
been the Bind an# Punjab province# of West Pakistan*' The 
reason-why this area ha# hear such a. heavy recruiting groin# 
was that it ha# bee®. settle# by the former warrior class 
that ha# ridden with the ffusliia armies ̂
is so many officers an# men of the Pakistani Army 
came .fro® the Western Province« the armed forces m m  com* 
aider©# to be foreigners by the East Pakistanis* There was# 
In 1955» only 14 of the 908 officers with the rank of major 
or above who were fro® Sash Pakistan* There was the same 
ratio in the sister services; 60 m %  of 700 in the Air. 
an# ■ ? out of 600 naval officers were last Pakistanis* flow** 
ever* the popularity of the -Army increase# in last Pakistan 
after 1957 because of the effective assistance it renders# 
to the civil authorities in suppressing smuggling aehivi** 
ties* The suppression of smuggling brought about lower food 
prices which ha# spiral©# to such an extent that approsdU* 
©ately cne*half of a peasant * n .income bad to be spent on 
food products*^
The organisation an# modernization of the Army was 
left to its officers.* an upper an# middle class oriented 
group who had receive# a western oriented education*
1 Wilcox, ££>„ eit** p* #|*.
SFasal Muquese* Khan-, the Story of the Pakistan Arm (Karachi t Oxford "University W a i ,  Ifbfj* p« 'ffg™rTrn
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Gradual progress was mad© to the .point where the Pakistani 
Army became a highly mobile fighting force# The success in 
establishing a formidable fighting force amid the political 
chaos has been attributed to the independence which the 
military was granted'by the government In asking its own 
decisions# !#o government agency had my significant in­
fluence over the military services* The Army did its own 
recruiting* training*- and assignment* They ware disciplined* 
well-equipped {particularly after 1956 when United States 
military aid began to arrive) and appeared to be admired and 
respected by ail segments of the Pakistan population,* About 
one-third of the overall expenditures of the central and 
provincial governments in 1956-57 was allocated to the mili­
tary
In spite of the Amsy*s power* there was no indica­
tion in 195$ that its leaders wished to enter politics or to 
take over the government administration# the senior offi­
cers* trained in the British tradition* had been taught 
to eschew politics and to take their orders from the consti­
tuted civil authorities* They had often been called upon 
to restore public order when the .police had been unable to 
do so* but they had withdrawn from this policing role at
*There are many conflicting figures given on the 
allocation to defease purposes* fie low and high given are 
from 30 to 10 pm  cent of the total budget#
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the first opportunity*1
The military did not completely refrain fro® enter** 
lug civilian politics* In 1951# Prime Minister H i  Khan's 
Office uncovered a conspiracy of a faction of military and 
civilian officials who were plotting to seise control of the 
military m i  then ultimately the govtrantst# the leaders of 
the conspiracy were arrested end brought to trial* They 
were convicted and sentenced* The prestige of the Army re** 
ceived a heavy blow even though the conspiracy failed*^
The Bawalpindi Conspiracy as it was called 9 emo 
about two or three months after the appointment of General 
Ayuts Khan as Cottseuu$er*ln~Chtef of the Army* Khan professed 
horror at the discovery of subversive officers within the 
ranks of the Aray* After the conspirators were sentenced v 
Khan proceeded to purge the military of other officers whose 
loyalty to Pakistan and the Army was in doubt* He then re* 
inforced discipline and embarked m  extensive training pro­
grams with the purpose of restoring popular confidence in 
the Amy*3
In 1954 » Governor General Ghulaa Mohamad hlMMlf * 
suggested to the Army that it take control of the country*
iQoodnowj, jog* eit* B p# 104*
%ul» Khan, frlgnds Rot MaBtera, ££. £ & . ,  P» 39, 
3Ibid.. p. 52.
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Xhwfr* to whoa the off or was made, refused* He told the 
Governor General:
I m  are being reckless and you will do the country 
Immense harm* 1 am engaged in building up the amy*
We hare m  enemy* an implacable enemy in India* * * #
I can serve this country better in my profession*i
la the political situation degenerated into chaos * 
the military- was left no alternativej something had to- be 
done to save Pakistan* the October* 195$ coup d'etat brought 
the military to power because the politicians had not been 
able to check the political and economic chaos which Pakistan 
was experiencing*2'
It should p however* be noted- that the military 
take-over in Pakistan was not an abrupt development, 
nor did it signify the elevation in status hierarchy 
of Pakistan- of any underprivileged group*?
the £*pe*lt&0& of martial law was announced, by 
President Mirza* who* it will be retailed * dissolved the 
Provincial and Central Assemblies * abrogated the Constitu­
tion and abolished political parties* the coup* or what is 
acre frequently referred to as the devolution * involved 
little movement of troops* It was a peaceful* almost blood** 
le«® operation in which Aynfe Khan expressed the desire that 
"the people should settle down very quickly and get on with
p. 5a*
%haa* m *  £&*» P« ?©*
%uptat &£* £&&•• P*
m
the rtcoiutanMtlon of the country#** He felt that martial 
law "would have assumed a negative complexion*1̂' if it had 
been used for punitive and repressive means«
Shan’s determination to rehabilitate the civil 
administration indicates the vain# he placed: on the civil 
service« On the other hand s Shan could for###© the prob- 
It®# of involving the Army too deeply in civil administra­
tion for h© believed that "the Amy would be destroyed If 
it got too mixed up in running, civil aiminictration*1*̂  There­
fore, on# of Shan’s initial action# was to met with S©cr#» 
taries to the Central Government and explain the actions 
and objectives of the revolution# Harbin! law, while giving, 
support to the civil authority* would at th# same time sub­
ject it to the supervision of th# two military provincial 
governors#
M  is difficult to determine the extant to which th© 
Army has acted a# a modernising agent in Pakistan# Gupta 
stab©# that th* Army was not a ■odmlsing ©lit# feecaus#,
•th* bop officer*# group in mm% armlet in th© developing 
region# * including Pakistan., often represents th# land-owning 
class and may be committed bo the preservation of all
%han, Friends Hot Masters# on# pit,#, p* 72#
2IM4* » P* 72*
3lbid., Po 77#
62
erstwhile privileges and social relationships*
fa further substantiate bia claim* he generalizes 
that the Array is often weak in the shills naeasaaxy to 
modernize a society and therefore wist work la association 
with the intelligentsia* la the case of Pakistans the- in® 
telllgentsia advocates Western parliamentary proceduresg 
therefore» the two groups cannot be readily aligned*2
In contradiction to Oupt&’a primary hypothesis is 
the fact that within three months of baking over the govern® 
ment * 'th© rec ©amend at ions of th© Land Reform Commission were 
announced* Immediate: steps to put the recommendations into 
effect m m  taken* This included the breakup of larger as® 
bates with an upper limit set on the number of productive 
"unit® a landlord could hold*^ In th© redistribution of 
land* lb was hoped that a m w  agricultural middle class would 
develops Over 6#000 landlords lost over two and one«half 
million acres*
Khan declared his intentions of improving social and 
■economic conditions and these appear- to have been genuine 
in the light of the reforms he has adopted as suggested by
%upta, jgg* oft** j>« 51*
2lMd-. pp. 51-52-
3 a unit varied from region bo region according to 
productivity* but no specific information is available*.
iKfean, ffrfenda Hot Masters* Q£a P* 9®*
63
th* Commissions* Within th® first year, tea commissions 
were- established mad before another twelve months had 
elapsed* the results of the Commissions on Credit* national 
Mutation* Maritime and th# location of th# Motional Cap!** 
tol were submitted J
Although social reform has not been dynamic * the 
military regime of Khan has mad# definite steps to imple­
ment social and economic improvements is association with 
improvements in technology# th* establishment of a .sound 
economic tease is essential to a developing nation* This 
criteria was one of the influencing factors which propelled 
the military elite to take over the government of Pakistan* 
for* In 195$« the nation was m  the brink of bankruptcy# 
the British had given little encouragement to th# 
development of domestic economy in India* this was- a re* 
flection of British mercantile policy* After partition» 
only ten per cent of th# total industrial units were located 
la Pakistan and this Mounted to 1*406 unit# employing, few 
people and these mainly ©a a seasonal teasis*̂  there was 
little capital available and few technicians* Apart from 
cottage industries which were traded, mainly In the environs 
of th# village* most industry involved th® processing of
libido, Appendix f*
%asic Facts (Karachi: Ministry of Information and
Broadcasting* Government of Pakistan# 1964)# p* 4t«
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r m  mUmimlm* Without substantial government aid in in- 
vestment and leadership# industrial and economic growth 
would be alow# for "most Moslem capitalists had tradition* 
allf been traders# and enterprise still turns more swiftly 
to commerce rather than industry*11 ?
Pakistan was la a hurry1 to accomplish definite steps 
towards economic modernisation and social betterment* which 
developing nations regard as imperative# A crucial decision 
facing all countries who wish to industrial!!# is whether 
it should be concerned with the processing of raw materials 
or if there should be a development of heavy industry*2 Th# 
test# and inexperience of the civil administration in indus­
trial and economic matters resulted in the failure of the 
first Six Tear ft»** which finally had to be dropped four 
years after its inception* A five Tear Plan ($$55*60) was 
not successful either# and the final years, were reorganised 
by Ayub Khan# who instituted a'more attainable two-year 
Priority Flan#
After careful consideration# a Second five Tear Flan 
was adopted in I960* This plan proved to be far more realis­
tic and more successful# The results nearly reached the 
objectives outlined# and the government earned th® confidence
%pate# p, 111#
^Outlook m  .Development {Karachi* The Department of 
Film# and Publications# Government of Pakistan# n*d*), p» 1*
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of economic spheres both within the nation and overseas*
ISm aehlevesients of the Second five fear Plan are apparent 
In the following figuresThe gross national product in­
creased a total of 29 per cent over the anticipated 24 per 
cent* Agricultural production was disappointing* tout did 
rise by 2*1 per cent over the Inoroftco rate of the 1950s*
The Manufacturing showed an annual growth rate of 14*6 per 
cent* Export earnings increased 7 per cent annually against 
the projected annual increase of 1 .per cent* Domestic sav­
ings exceeded the projected our by Is* 476 crones*2 Pride 
was expressed in the fact that foreign aid for the project* 
such as World Mmk loans was reduced frea 50 per cent to 
|d per cent*
In the drive to achieve the economic goals* strict 
import controls had be be levied*- Credit regulation# were 
also necessary* a# was some tax relief to encourage industry* 
One result of the economic .growth was that more Jobs have 
been created within the bureaucratic and technical fields*
the actual degree of growth is the direct reflection 
of the nation*# #developB«nt strategy and the policies that 
subserve it and th® adequacy of the institution# guarding 
and conducting economic activities **3 Those who direct th©
2z jmSwpm&i m* sii». ?• ’5.
%»ib of ten million*
X̂bjld*» p* 4*
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eeostoiaie activity in Pakistan are responsible to the presi­
dent awl fraction through the Financial Ministry awI the 
President* s Secretariat* la addition , there are a timber of 
government sponsored commissions which vary in importance awl 
influence* An example &f ouch is the Pakistan Planting 
Commission which authors the Five tear Plans*'* there are 
also government corporations which have been created to 
boost protection* the types of activities and leadership 
varies as tees the financial resources* but they are gen­
erally commercial operations involved in the fields of 
industry* agriculture, water, and power development
fhe third Five Tear Flan was implemented in 1965 
■end was. the first stage In a twenty-year projection of 
priorities necessary to develop a self-sustaining economy*
In mid-196? the expected rise of 5*2 per cent in the gross 
national protect showed that the pace of economic develop­
ment had not slackened*^
%laslhu»-s&man, ̂  eft* * pp* 92-95*
%halM B* Ssyeedi * Pakistan: lew Challenges to the 
Political. S y s t e m Asian Survey * ¥IT, lo* 2 {Feb., 1966), 97*
3Tlae M&gaatne * August 25, 1967, Fol. 10, Ho. 0, p* 1#*
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THE CIVIL SmtXCB II THE EFFORT
A bureaucracy evolve* Oh* principles by which lb 
operates* These principles sot the pattern for the autonomy 
and the professional standards that dictate the degree of 
implementation of laws and policies that the bureaucracy 
makes**
The primary concern of & bureaucracy is the freedom 
It ©an. gain from the apex; of the power structure* To achieve 
this aim* a sphere of professionalism in government adminis­
tration was established which contrasted to the ”raore ehar&a* 
antic or traditional legitimation of the ruling elite*”
Thus* the policies of a bureaucracy become firmly entrenched* 
while political .policies may fluctuate according to the 
whims of the ruler*2
The framework which is evolved by a bureaucracy* 
through which it operates,. influences the participation of 
the bureaucracy in the output of a political system* It is. 
through this framework that the bureaucracy makes its output?
Is* I* Liaenstadt* o&» ©it*.* p* 15 9*
2Ibid*. p* 159*
^Outputs represent the decisions and: policies of the 
government, Pereas input refers to the demands 'and interest 
of the people brought into- the political system with the in­
tent of influencing the outputs of the governing groups*
m
ansi the strength of a bureaucracy can he gauged by the 
degree in which it monopolizes output*1
Essential to this process is a source irm which 
broad policy emanates * the directive influence cones from 
the -ruling elite and can vary according to the authority 
wielded by the elibe*^
'Where the ruling elite displays strength, it can 
exert pressures on the bureaucracy to adhere strictly to 
policy* This say he achieved by placing individuals or 
groups of individuals responsible to the ruling elite .into 
the hierarchy of the bureaucratic framework*3 %% can also 
be achieved by dispensing with the official decision-making 
body* Almost the same result m y  be gained through playing 
one section of the bureaucracy against the otherA
Regardless of the extent to which the bureaucracy 
is regulated |, the adaini st rat ion of a state depends upon 
that bureaucracy* therefore, It will be instrumental to 
varying degree® in the Implementation of policy*^
Where a .ruling, elite is beset by dissension, or
1 Gabriel A* Aliasnd and §* Binghas Powells Compara­
tive Polities? ,<4 Development Approach (Boston? ' Little, 
Wown aMGoipany» T9©6), p* 1 §3*
%bld«« p* 10, % M L ® ,  m *  Mk** P« 57.
%Lsenstadt, <|g# ett*» p0 161*
$3hllaf cit* # p* 57*
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where directives to th# administrative bureaucracy are hoti
clearly defined» there will be a considerable leeway in the 
interpretation of polity* It la in this situation that the 
bureaucracy la able to Interpret and enforce policies me* 
cording to Its own criteria.*’*
this study is primarily concerned with about four 
hundred and tern persons who collectively- constitute the 
Civil Service of Pakistan (CSP) or the administrative 
elite* The CSP can best be understood by reviewing its 
history as m  institution* it Is the successor in Pakistan 
of the famous Indian Civil Service, which can trace its 
origins back to- the year 1600, when Queen Elisabeth X author*# 
imd the incorporation of a private trading company which 
became known as the East Indian Company., In 1&53# #&•» the 
Company*# charter was renewed for the last time,, the British 
Parliament, stipulated that appointments to the higher posi­
tions were to be made on the basis of competitive ©stamina*. 
tlon$« The examinations stressed academic knowledge in th® 
liberal arts subject# and contained many option# ■§© that th® 
applicant could demonstrate hi.® proficiency in his major 
college courses* Civil Service examinations in India and 
Pakistan have retained the academic emphasis to this day*2
The Indian Civil Service {ISC) was the most important
*Almond and Power, ©£» .cit» s p„ 154*
20oodnow, ££* clt** »* 32*
instrument ©£ British control In India. Almost all of th© 
top administrative and judicial posit ions were hold by 
Indian Civil Service officers# Even th©' provincial gover­
nors ner© frequently drawn from it® ranks# In accordant© 
with British practice , th© police and military services 
m m  subordinated to the civil authorities# thus, th# Civil 
Sarvlo© officers were the men who ruled India; they war© 
responsible only to th© Governor-General of India and th# 
British Government#1
fh# leaders of Pakistan » confronted with drastic 
needs for administrative personnel, turned naturally to those 
individual® who had. served with th# Indian Civil Service**
the Civil Service of Pakistan la the successor in 
Pakistan of the Indian Civil Service, which was the 
most distinguished Civil Service in the world# Although 
the largest of the Superior Services, it Is a body of a 
£ m  hundred only*. Hut it consists of m m  who, under 
ministerial and legislative direction, ©nereis# many of 
th# most important functions of government and on whom, 
subject to such direction, lies the prime responsibility, 
well-being and good government of their country#3
the few hundred did not have a complete monopoly on 
all the important administrative positions. These indi­
viduals were part of the so-called Central Superior Service's, 
which also included th# Pakistan foreign Service, the Police
1 Arthur Vincent Smith, Thm Oxford History of India 
(OxfordI Clarendon Press, 19231# pi^oSA-S^V
2Almond and Coleman, g&<, cit#, p« 237#
31? Careers in th# Pakistan Superior Services The. 
Secretariat latabliakaent Division (Karachi, 1951),
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Service» the Audits and Accounts Service of a fax Collector , 
the Bailway Service., and. the Postal Service* two of the 
services mentioned above, the Police Service of Pakistan 
and the Civil Service of Pakistan bore the major responsi­
bility for the preservation of law and order* Although the 
administrative officer generally outranked his police counter­
part and could give him orders In an emergency situation, h® 
usually refrained from interfering with police operations*
The British had developed a. Civil Service primarily 
to maintain law and order and the collection of revenue* If 
the revenues were collected and order was "preserved, the 
peasants were allowed to lead their lives in the manner to 
which they had become accustomed for two thousand years* To 
the British the establishment of law and order was para­
mount*
It is not for those who live in acre fortunate 
countries to underestimate the vital importance of a 
system that effectively preserves law and order* Bo 
district officer could forget how close to anarchy lay 
the communities under his supervision. Be had to- he 
continuously aware that his action within a matter of 
minutes sight make the difference between a display of 
had temper,and a serious riot involving scores of live® and homes**
The sen. who entered the service did so at an early 
age and m m  Immediately given considerable responsibility* 
Often they were' told to proceed with their Jobs without
1Callsrd, 2£, clt.. p. 287.
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waiting for orders fro® above,'*' Clerical positions mi 
personnel were also under the Civil Service mi were re* 
bruited by competitive examinations. Most of the better 
clerical jobs required a bachelor's degree although the
chances of being promoted fro®, one of these offices to a 
Superior Service post were poor,. Finally, at the bottom 
-of the hierarchy were a large number of -menial employees** 
the messengers guards servants and various manual, workers. 
Although no accurate figures on the number of 
civilian employees can be given, a very rough estimate, of 
the number of civilians employed by Pakistan government la 
1957 would be about 650,000, Out of this number employed. 
Perhaps lees than 1,000 held key decision-making posts,2 
Members of the legislatures were prevented from 
interfering with the bureaucracy. Initially, the autonomy 
which the CSP enjoyed was a carry-over from th© practice of 
th© Indian Civil Service, Th# aim there was to protect 
British appointed civil servants against possible hostili­
ties from an Indian cabinet or legislature, Under the 
provision of the Covermeat of India Act a public servant 
should not be punished by provincial authorities, If any 
disciplinarian action were to be taken, the civil servant
1Ibid,, p, 267,
2Ibid,, p. 292,
n
was still, given the opportunity to defend himself and was 
sat it fed to at least one appeal if .ha were found guilty* 1 
this custom was written into Chapter 1 of the 1956 Constitu­
tion * This chapter of the Constitution was- designed to 
insulate the high civil officers from political influence«
To alter the status and protection which the- Civil Service 
enjoyed, an amendment to the Constitution would he required* 
The Constitution further provided that appointments to the 
higher administrative positions be made by the president or 
someone designated by him.* In. the face of these constitu­
tional barriers, the elected representatives were in a rela­
tively weak position, vis-a-vis the bureaucracy* Their 
Influence over the permanent personnel was confined to the 
transfer of a disagreeable civil servant from one post to 
another#
toother element of strength of the Civil Service was 
the inherent weakness of the elected assemblies* The politi­
cal experience of the politicians had been relatively short; 
the senior civil servant on the other hand had long been 
accustomed to power and prestige# The civil servants felt 
that if responsible gov@rn.stnt were to break down* the civil 
service would have to take over the full powers of govern­
ment#
*lbid«* p* 294*
fender these circumstances the civil servants have fetes 
•t least the equals of cabinet ministers, and their 
education and experience of administration has often, 
rendered the® their superiors* this state -of affairs 
that can find a final remedy only whoa cabinet govern­
ment M s  been successfully established at the center 
and in the provinces**
Weaknesses did exist In the Civil Service system* 
the small number of experienced officers which Pakistan 
Md at partition necessitated the appointment of new per- 
sonnel, many of then unqualified* Furthermore* the adminis­
trative system developed fey the British in the latter half 
of the nineteenth century* and the changes introduced during 
the last forty years of British rule amounted to modifica­
tions rather than drastic reformation* this attitude toward 
change was adopted fey the Pakistan Civil Service* the pri­
mary objective of the Civil Service seemed to fee that of 
keeping the existing institutions .functioning smoothly rather 
than introducing Innovations*®
the most severe criticism of the Civil Service is 
the charge of corruption .among the public servants* Corrup­
tion took two forms* political and criminal*
'The political influence of government servant# is 
very great* An illiterate voter 1# ready to believe 
that he should do whatever he is told fey government*
And the powers of a District Magistrate asm either aid 
or hinder the candidacy of a politician* Consequently* 
political pressure has been at work to persuade or
Mallard* o£„ cit*, p» 296* 
2Ibld**. p. 296*
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compel! government servants to intervene la party 
politic®J
Ant official who did m %  respond to the political pressure# 
faced the possibility of feeing transferred to m  undesirable 
pact* the civil servants recognised the danger, end through 
the Council of Administration, recommended to the government 
that ^tenures for nost of the appointments should be fixed 
end transfers before the expiry of tenure should fee rare* 
transfers should not be sad* as a matter of punishment*11̂
'the power of the Civil Service extended into the 
business sector to such m  extent that individual fortunes 
could fee- won according to the gratuities granted 'fey the 
service* Because there existed a shortage of staff members , 
many of these officials operated without supervision or 
control* the government attempted to curtail illicit tran­
sactions fey inaugurating two actsi Prevention of Corruption 
Act, 1947 and the Special Police Establishment let 194$* 
These lets were created to investigate and bring to trial 
cases in which bribery awl corruption had taken place in 
the Central and Provincial Governmentso In more than five 
years, 5,000 corruption cases were brought before the 
courts* However, less than' one in ten of the accused were
1£Md, & j>* 297*
2Iiowiand Egger, Th§. ImarovMMiiat. M  .Public AdttAiila- 
tration F§fe||g, P* 1J7 cited ln cSllerd, j ^ * 7 p * $ 9 7 *
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convicted. In 194$* Blast Bengal established a similar 
Anti-Corruption Department* Of the 6,160 cases, 2*3#$ 
resulted in convictions**
In 1953 further action was taken under the Preven­
tion of Corruption Act# Under the rules m  officer was 
presumed to be guilty of corruption if rumors persisted that 
the official was corrupt, Also, if the officer or his 
dependents were unable to account for property they held, 
or they were judged to be living beyond their visible means 
of support* the officer was assumed to be corrupt*2
toy criticism of the public services in Pakistan must 
be set against one paramount fact; the machinery of 
government has continued to function through ten years 
of extraordinary difficulty* This has been due almost 
entirely to the work of the services*, for the quality 
of the political leadership has been neither high or 
vigorous* The public has become Inured to the idea that 
the politicians are corrupt, but it can still bo in­
censed by the revelation of the betrayal of trust by a civil servant #3
In Pakistan, the judiciary# except for the Supreme 
Court* is .part of the Civil Service* Recruitment for the 
High, district, m i  Sessions courts is divided between the 
CSP and the Sar* To be qualified for an appointment to the 
High Court, an individual is required to have been advocate 
for at least ten years, or a aembir of the CSP for the m m
^Canard, £j>* pit*« p. 29$#
2Ibid#* p* 29#*
Hbti* * p* 29$*
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period and served as a District Judge for at least three 
years* Appointments are made by the President after eon- 
saltation with the Chief Justice, To qualify for the 
Supreme Court the minimum standard is five years on a High 
Court or fifteen years as an Advocate*
The District Magistrate is a CO? officer who has 
Jurisdiction in both criminal and revenue cases* But his 
main duties lay In the field of administration* After a 
period of service he could request m transfer' to the Judi­
cial Branch
The fact that many of the Judges in Pakistan are mem­
bers of the C3P and have had experience as administra- . 
tive officials means that the courts have a substantial 
degree of sympathy for the needs of government. But, 
once a judge is appointed he guarantees security of tenure* A judge of a High Court may be removed only 
by a resolution supported by two-thirds of the members 
of a National Assembly,*
Attempts were mad# in 1954 to separate th© judicial
and executive functions of th# District Magistrate, Formerly
the District f%gistrat# was responsible for making rules,.
enforcing them, and punishing their violation, A plan was
adopted to separate these functions* Each district was
assigned an additional District Magistrate to preside over
judicial functions* It became .his responsibility to hear
appeals from lesser magistrates and handle original cases
1Xbld., p* 299,
2Ibid,, p* 300.
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under the Pakistan Penal Code*
the judiciary retained a high degree of independence 
despite the military take-over in 195$* To ensure that the 
executive and the legislature acted with the provisions of 
the constitution,. Ayub Khan advocated the establishment of 
an independent judiciary#** But without the power of judi­
cial review* A& defined, the Supreme Court would ttadvise 
the president when a question of law has arisen or is likely 
t© arise which is of public importance.112 However, the 
advisory opinion was binding on neither the president or the 
lower courts#
The present government has respected judicial deci­
sions* In 1964 the leaders of the Jamraat-i-Islami, a power­
ful, orthodox, Muslim political party, were arrested for 
leading an unlawful association* Arriving at a decision 
under Section 6 of the Political Parties Apt 1962, the 
Supreme Court ruled that the action of the government was 
invalid and that the leaders were being unlawfully retained# 
The government accepted the court’s decision and the men 
were released*!
As was mentioned earlier in this section, the C3F 
inherited many of its institutional characteristics from
1'Ayiib Khm, M i M a  M  ItlifEi* m *  MMs* P* 199*
2Fass!ul laque Kesri., MJudicial Independence in
Pakistan,” MmM M  Uuguot, 19671, p* 26#
3The Times /i@m4m7« September 29, 1964*
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its predecessor, the Indian Civil Service. Indeed, the 
resemblance was striking no matter whether one looks at the 
organization and procedures or the recreational activities 
and social habits of the higher civil servants, the ICS was 
devised as a system of control by an alien pewar* and there 
is considerable agreement that It was a highly successful 
institution# Seldom in history have so many been governed 
and ruled by so few,1
However* it is necessary to ask whether a system 
devised to serve the British in India served equally well 
when transferred to Pakistan* The answer is not surprising* 
The transplanted institutions worked reasonably well. Con­
ditions were favorable in Pakistan, because its people were 
used to the system and not familiar with any other. The 
Pakistan version of the ICS was successful la bringing a 
degree of order out of chaos, The revenues were collected* 
and. other traditional functions were carried on in much the 
same way as before partition* These were major accomplish- 
©eats*
However* the bad features of British administration 
in India as well as the good.* were evident in the transplan­
ted institution* The G3P, like the ICS, was autonomous* It 
controlled its own recruitment, training and indoctrination*
1Callard* £d, git., p. 2$4*
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disciplinary procedures, performance ratings* promotions and 
transfers# and administrative investigations* In the Inter- 
oats of public tranquility# it sometimes prevented public 
meetings or silenced the press# and occasionally an un­
cooperative politician was placed in jail, It might be 
argued that the CSP was subject to even less control than 
the ICS because the latter had been tinder the critical eye 
of the Secretary of State for India, and important policy 
questions were subject to review by the Cabinet or even the 
British Parliament* Pakistan's national and provincial 
legislatures were inexperienced and preoccupied with other 
matters* It occasionally criticised the CSP, but the legis­
latures could not control it because the higher services 
had been given considerable protection against political 
influence under the Indian Act and the 1956 constitution*
To protect competence, responsiveness was sacrificed,^
Although neither the ICS nor the CSP was effectively 
controlled by any representative institution in India or 
Pakistan# the ICS was always subject to the orders of the 
British government, The ICS might do as it pleased in India 
for considerable periods of time# but sooner or later a 
governmental commission would be sent from London to look 
into the administration of India, The authority of the
J, H«wman» nThe Constitutional Evolution of 
Pakistan*H International Affairs* XIX¥X, Ho, 3 {duly, 1962)« 
156*
*1
British government to intervene wight occasionally be 
resented, but it could not be seriously questioned* The 
CSP, on the other hand, was not subject to any comparable 
control either inside or outside of Pakistan* It is never 
easy to force change on a strong bureaucracyj in Pakistan 
there was. no representative institution strong, enough to do 
that job, so the CSP continued to follow procedures and 
practices that were no longer appropriate under a republican 
fora of government that was striving to prostate national 
development, thus both the machinery of government and the 
attitudes of those who filled the higher positions seemed 
better adapted to meet the problems of a previous era than, 
the problems which confronted Pakistan in 195#-«
Urn fiteU 3smkm M m  mJMrnx Ma
Although President Ayub Khan acknowledged the vital 
role of the civil services and repeatedly said that military 
rule would enable them to get on with their business without 
political interference | one of the main theses of his program; 
was the elimination of corruption and inefficiency In the 
public serviced To this end, the President set up a
t*One of the major objectives of the Revolution was 
the cleaning up of the public life of Pakistan* So far as 
the Services are concerned* there were well-known complaints 
of corruption,- misconduct {in the form of favoritism and 
nepotism) and the inefficiency of some of the Government ser­
vants* But the rules which then existed were so lax as t© 
make it almost impossible to remove a public servant for mis­
conduct or inefficiency*” (Pakistan lews M m m % * duly 1, 1959*)
#a
acreeniiig committee m  mrlf as Hovember* 195# to assess the
efficiency and integrity of official® and the clerical staff
of the Central Government,, In general, the line of command
was followed; civil, servants reviewed the records ©f ether
civil service employees who were subordinate in rank* If a
screening committee decided that there was a case against an
official* he would be given the opportunity to defend himself
orally and in writing and would have the right to .appeal to
a special committee created for the purpose* The goal was
not only to weed out undesirable elements but also to deter
public servants from indulging in .malpractices in the future*
la the three-week period ending July 7* 1f59* more
than 2*000 federal and provincial officers were removed fro®
office or otherwise punished:
Of the 1*660 Federal Civil Service officers punished* 
#19 were dismissed or compulsorily retired* They ranged 
from a Charge dfAffairs® abroad who was retired because 
of inefficiency to- senior secretaries of Government* 
police officers and those belonging to the once notori­
ously corrupt Supply Department# * * * Other® were de­
moted or placed on probation* Those retired were 
allowed pensions due to- them under service rules*1
However * for the most part.* dismissals and eoapulsary re­
tirements* and reduction in rank was most prevalent at the 
lower ranks* There were a few C3P officers convicted of 
inefficiency in office but at the completion ©f the screen­
ing of committees* the CSP was still ia an influential
1 The lew fork Times, July #* 1959* p» 9*
position«.
The actions taken against mmf of the public ser­
vants was significant la view of the fact that prior to tfe® 
Ayub Khan regime tbs tenure of the higher civil servants 
m s  protected by constitutional guarantees* these consti­
tutional provisions were- removed fey a presidential order 
in March 1959* the actions taken against civil servants 
m m  mi® by military encouragement* Although there had 
been mm% talk of corruption and inefficiency prior to the 
195# revolution, the civil servants acting alone had never 
tried to cleanse their own ranks*
At first the CSP rejected the military regime* bub* 
on further consideration and realising that they could best 
protect their positions* the CSP accepted a partnership with 
the military*1 Furthermore* once the alliance m s  formed, 
the administrative officer® were then In a stronger position 
to carry out their InstructIons without political interfer­
ence* Sow it was possible to proceed with economic planning 
without the interruptions of the political elements in the 
society* Today, there can he no question that the Involu­
tion has asserted a tighter control and more efficient 
operation of government activities than any of its prede­
cessors* The more efficient and effective operation of
*Albert Corvine, MThe Civil Service Under the 
Revolutionary Government in Pakistan,w Middle Rest Journal(aunwr* 1*5)f p* 3*t*
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government resulted from this eontr#1« In these aspects of 
the revolution’s activities the Civil Service has been cru­
cial* the skills and capacities of the CSF were indiapea- 
sable to the fulfillment of the administration’s progress*1 
Previous to the military take-over, the Civil Ser­
vice had been frustrated In its ability to perform its 
duties* Incompetent and irresponsible politicians had.crea­
ted a situation where it was almost impossible for the Civil 
Service to obtain finances with which to discharge its 
duties* the enactment of Martial law enabled the Civil Ser­
vice to execute what measures they considered expedient,® 
and above all® free of politicians * interference^
The introduction of Sasic Democracies further 
broadened: the influence and power of the Civil Service* 1b® 
structure of Sasic Democracies is so constructed that the 
administrative officers are able to overrule the decisions 
of the elected officials at the lower tier levels* Further­
more , a close Inspection of the whole Stole Democracies 
scheme reveals the degree of power and influence the Civil 
Service has in the decision .making process of Pakistan* At 
the lower levels of the pyraaid structure of Basic Democra­
cies the majority of the members are sleeted officials*
1Sisir I* Gupta, gg* pit* * p« 53*
*Ayub Khan, M»¥,» M .  Sa2SSE*« gg* oit-« p« 73*
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However, near the top of the structure all positions of 
Importance are held by appointed members of the Civil and 
Military Serviced
The boat indication as to'whether or not there will 
be a major change in Pakistan, is to be found In the 
massive expansion of the CSP, This highly qualified 
generalist servlet is the only service which can under- 
take the leadership required in a massive economic 
development program* To date, the opposition to such 
expansion ha# been so .great that it has even questioned 
the intellectual capacity of the young m m  of Pakistan, 
Innumerable statement# have been made by CSP men that 
Pakistan doe# not produce more than 25 qualified men,a 
year for admission into, the CSP*
* * * In vmmaatft the functioning of the Pakistan Civil Service in the revolutionary government provides an 
interesting case study of the role of a tradition-bound 
bureaucracy in a new country* In its struggles to main­
tain It# privilege# and Its relationship with the mili­
tary* it has seriously threatened to impair the momentum 
©f the Revolution* Initially frightened and perhaps 
still somewhat concerned about the military1# power , 
the CSP has been able to survive during the years of 
recent turmoil by adjusting to the marginal demands 
and administration innovations of the Revolution, Its 
success ha# largely been determined by the essentially 
non-revolutionary nature of Ayub Khan5# seimir# of 
■power* Had Ayub Khan acted with the bold and radical 
determination that. Americans have now mm- to associate 
with revolutions, the CSP could never have survived* As 
an entrenched bureaucracy with an orderly but tradition- 
bound mode of work* it would have been the first target 
of a genuine revolutionary Impulse* That It did survive 
and successfully retain its privileged status is a 
reflection upon Ayah Shan*# ideology of power and', also 
upon his acceptance of the CSP as a necessary though 
inhibiting instrument of government**
The dependence of President Ayub Khan upon the 
cooperation of civil and military services has limited the
*Corvine, M *  &}&•* pp* 135-36*
m
bypm  aad auabers of programs he can .initiate* Though he
ha# spoken out against the effects of pressure groups* he
still has found it wise to listen to their demands*
My own analysis has led «e to the conclusion that 
Pakistan needed a strong government capable of making 
decisions which might not be popular but which are necessary for the' safety, integrity and, in particular, 
development of the country* lie could not afford the 
luxury of a system which would make the existence of 
the government subservient to the whims and operations 
of pressure groups* On this 1 was not prepare# to sake 
any compromise*1
However, Khan has found It expedient to compromise.* land-
reforms were on* of bh® first major programs which Khan
wished to commence* However * as a .great portion of the
major officers is the military were either large landowners
themselves or were related by birth or marriage to land
owning families, they balked at any program which would
deprive them of holdings*® furthermore, Khan has been
restricted in his desire to cut the military budget* 'the
military have argued that with India representing © hostile
neighbor, any reductions in the defense budget would b®
interpreted as a sign of weakness or concession*
The Civil Service on the other hand has resisted.
attempts by Khan to initiate legislation, which would punish
individuals who have practiced corruption* One of the most
repeated criticisms of the Khan government has been that of
11£&SL>. P. *13.
2Qupta, j&* tip* * p* 51*
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the economic rewards which have come about ©lac# the 1957 
coup* little of It baa found Its way to those who- needed 
it most# The principal beneficiaries hare either bee® or 
are members of the bureaucracy# *
The President »a Position with the Military 
and Mvil Service
Adoption of the 1962 constitution did not alter the 
realities of political power* As was the case with previous 
Pakistan governments p the president was still obligated to 
recognise one important reality5 he had to retain the coopera* 
tioa and support of military and civil services to assure 
his political solvency*^ Kfcaa had been able to establish 
strong support within the army during, his tenure as Gamma* 
d®r«in~Chief of the Armed Services# the support had evolved 
as a result of Khan*© programs to restore morale and effi* 
ciency in. the military following the Rawalpindi Conspiracy 
in 1951* A group of politicians with the .aid of some Junior 
officers in the Amy were plotting to seise power of the 
Army, then eventually the country* Before the conspiracy 
could, materialise it was discovered and the conspirators
1 The Times /hQn&QpJ* Feb0 Z$9 1964 * p» 6«
2Khalid B« Sayeed* 11 The Capabilities of Pakistan’s 
Political System#” Asia .purvey {February*: 196?)* p.* 100*
at
m m  arrested and eventually Jailed* However, the Army 
still received a "black-eye” from the incident and a lee® 
of confidence « m g  the civilian population. It became the 
undertaking of than to re-eetabiish this confidence and 
rebelId the morale of the Army* Before the 19$B coup Khan 
.had been successful in his venture and as a result gained 
the appreciation and loyalty of the major officer® in the 
services*
CHAPTER VI
t m  iMnm^sm
To m m m  the role of the interest groups In Pakis­
tan it will be necessary to- discuss the influence which 
these groups exert upon the government end to review the 
means by which their demands are introduced to the ruling 
bodies,
t& assess political communication Ssi Pakistan it 
would be advantageous to include a short discussion on the 
status of communications in a transitional society# *Thn 
outputs of messages fro* the authoritative government struc­
tures in a transitional society#w states Almond, #tends to 
be far larger than the input sassages from the society 
What are some of the elements in this fora of society which 
could create this imbalance in input or wfeed-back* to 
government officials or persons occupying influential posi­
tions? One element comes immediately to mind # the tech­
nological level of achievement could create such an imbal­
ance# let * the success of ’feed-back*’ is not determined by 
the level of technological advance but rather by the
iAlmond and Coleman, o£# .cffc# * p# 51#
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sensitivity which each group has to the reactions of smother 
group,1 the transitional„ authoritative society Is able to
transmit its output® through various media to the rural
areas, but it is quit* reasonable 'to argue that the Inhabit
teats of these region® do not comprehend the meaning of
the message 02 Under these elrewwtantsa» the input fro®
the rural area® i® reduced enormously -and therefore each
group remains insensitive to each other#
Among the journalists, radio and television comment*
tutors in a modern society there is on established standard
of excellences
by which they can judge each other’s performance* 
there may be such confusion and lack of precision 
in this concept of profession, but there is on# cen­
tral assumption upon which the entire modern commu­
nications industry is built* this is the assumption 
that the objective and unbiased reporting of event# 
is possible and that the sphere of .politics can beet 
be observed from, a neutral or non-partisan perspee*tiv#*S
the media in transitional societies do not adhere to this 
assumption* lather, individuals involved in the receiving 
and sending of messages interpret the communications and. 
present their ® m  prejudiced view,* The citlsenry and the
1Py©„ QQo eito« p# 15% Aim see, Amltai Itsicni, 
Pj>liMcal UniftoMon iriew forks Molt, Hinehart, and Win­
stonInc,, 1W5)» p* 74*
2Almond and Coleman* gjg« cit», p* §2#
% e ,  OB* $!&** P* f6|#
*Ibld. it p# 164*
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citizens. If Independent media da exist* then it is possible 
for the government to «o«m the media into accepting the 
messages which will be communicated J
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which inhibits the press from being a *watch-dogn of govern*
merit* The ordinance gave the government sweeping powers
with which to suppress and penalise newspapers which were
ultra-critical of the Ilian administration* Offensive pufelt*
cations coaid he seised by the government in their entirety
if editorials ©r subject matter in the papers were judged
to be offensive to the government or its personnel#. There**
for©# the ordinance has had the effect of muscling the press#
Furthermore, the government has utilised other means In
influencing the subject matter of the press*
« » » the Government has mad# a© secret of its use 
of Its advertising as reward or denial, coercion to 
its newspapers*
The result is that the English language daily 
press is eealously conformist* Some Urdu and Ben­
gali newspapers still venture to criticise, but are 
promptly made to suffer for It#**
Through its control of the press, the government has tried
to create a favorable image of the president as a man who
is constantly concerned with the economic and political
development of the country#
Output from the government is also achieved fey the. 
utilisation of the Civil Service*
Si mm  the government party is not functioning 
efficiently, the government has had to rely m  the 
bureaucratic machinery to publicise its development 
program* In 1#? the existing bureaucratic machinery
1rXhe Times /Tendon?, February 25, 1#4, p. d*
%
was augmented by the creation of a West Pakistan 
Information Service*1
The Pakistan government baa a virtual monopoly of 
radio and television* However* the influence of television 
prior to 1967 is doubtful* It is only within the last year 
that a television _ station was established in Pakistan# In 
contrast* the government has utilised radio in presenting 
its politics to the citissenry* It has been claimed by the 
government that almost ninety-five per cent of the popula­
tion in last Pakistan can be reached by radio-* la West 
Pakistan the figure has beta given at sixty per cent#®
The restrictive policies on inputs which the govern** 
meat has practice# has been generate# by the desire to 
effectively control or change a 9hostile political environ** 
sent#.® The administration has begun to question its 
repressive controls as factors which m f  extend its re­
sources an# creating further hostilities in the society*
Thus* Governor Slones Khan of Bast Pakistan admitted 
that nif a Government machinery was to constantly 
engage itself in the maintenance of law an# order it 
was impossible for %hm to do m y  sort of planning an# 
carry on development work*®
1 Khali# i* Sayeei* '̂Pakistan* Mew Challenges to 
the Political System*® Apian Survey {February» 196§)* p« 102# President Khan has been unable to inject sufficient 
enthusiasm and organisation ability into his party to enable 
it to launch a mass contact an# education program with the 
people*
2XbicL * p. 102*
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* * , Similarly, party officials fa&v© been repeatedly 
told to mum the people that the opposition is deter­
mined to mislead them by emotional slogans and ap­
peals J
There is a certain degree of "feed-back''* to the 
govemaeat* la most eases it comes fro© the opposition 
parties in the Assemblies* However , it is doubtful if the 
"feed-back" has any influence upon government policy*
It is obvious in the m m  both of the Assemblies 
and of the gmmtmmt political party that the .govern­
ment is not yet capable ©f responding m  as to accommo­
date the demands that the political groups have been, 
making* The government probably feels that most of 
these demands are irreconcilable with Its own objec­
tives.2
the domination which the government of Pakistan 
exercises over the channels of communication and m m  media, 
and the reluctance of the government to respond to the 
demands of other vested interests in the country has re­
stricted the development of interest articulation* Interest 
articulation Is defined by Almond as? ^claims, demands 
for political action**^ The danger of continuing to follow 
such a policy is that it perpetuates the concept that 
violence is the only means of achieving political access 
to the ruling elite*
However, even when used deliberately, violence 
always has the possibility of passing beyond the control
1Ibid*. p* 101*
%Ihid». p* 101*
3Almond and Coleman, png* clt*, p* 33*
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of its promoters. It has serious liabilities as a for® 
of access# not the least of which is real clanger to 
life and property for' those who use it. Characteristic, 
eally , violence has been employed by those group* in 
the political system which feel they have the least to 
lose fro® chaotic upheaval# and which face an enormous 
gap between possessions and expectations. But due to 
its obvious liabilities# the violence is usually less 
frequent where other channels for articulation of de­
mands are open to a wide range of groups in the soci­
ety*1
And it also delays the democratic growth in a society*
* . * the fate of democracy in the new states can be 
-inspired not just by appreciating the basic values of 
a democratic society but also by understanding the 
nature of polities as a process by which conflicting 
interests can be brought out into the open and then 
adjustments can toe male which will maximize the inter­
ests of all parties, for this to take place there must 
toe an open process toy which interests are articulated 
.and aggregated into 'public policies,*
iBUUml Ad&a&aftteB
The growth of articulation or articulation access 
to- policy makers does not necessarily guarantee that the 
Interest groups will have any influence upon political 
decisions* The deciding factor rests upon the acceptance 
of the ruling group or individual on the wlegitimacy of the 
claim, or a general attitude regarding group participation**^
Four main types of structures may be involved in 
interest articulation: (1) institutional interest
1Gabriel A, Almond and 0* Bingham Powell# on, cit.n
p, 62*
2Pye* ££* Git., p* 61*
3Almond and Powell# o£» -olto** p* fit*
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groups , 12} non-aasoelationai interest groups , (3) 
anomie interest groups* and |4) associations! interest 
groupso*
Institutional interest groups are defined as being organi­
sations snob ass legislatures* political parties* politi­
cal executives * armies * bureaucracies * and charehe®*
These are organisations which parfovn other social 
or political functions but which are corporate bodies 
or through groups within them * * * m y  articulate their 
own interests or represent the interests of groups in 
the society#*
Ion«associatlonal interest groups include kinship and lineage 
groups* ethnic* regional* religious* status and class group® 
in which .articulation is transmitted through the leader® 
of the groups* Anomic interest groups are unconsctralned 
movements in which articulation is expressed by riots and 
demonstrations * Associations! interest groups represent 
the special interest group® such ast trade union®* busi­
ness and ethnic organisation#^^
Of the institutional Interest groups in Pakistan, 
only the army and bureaucracy have been effective in having 
their demands receive political action* the lack of 
response by the ruling elites towards the demands of the 
other group® has created m  uneasy political climate*
fAlmond and Coleman, g&<> elt*« p* 33*
2Ibid*, po 33 *
$M&*» PP* 33-34®
9*
During 196?, several major political groups were hostile 
to the government* Generally, "the protests emanated from 
three sectors? the political (in the form of meetings and 
processions), the industrial (strikes), and the traditional 
{sectarian riots k n* Iwenbwally the situation deteriorated 
to where there was a threat to law and order mi the govern- 
meat found it necessary to rely upon regulative and coercive 
capabilities to control the hostile .political environment*
the two mechanisms it usually employed to control 
the hostile environment were Section 144 of the Crim­
inal Procedure Code and the Defense of Pakistan tales 
framed under the- Defense of Pakistan Ordinance 1965 
during the short war with India* Glider Section 144, 
the government imposed restrictions on the holding of 
meetings or processions s and on carrying firearm® and 
other weapons for periods of up to two months* Under 
the Defense of Pakistan tales, Rule 32 was used to de­
tain persons who were deemed, likely through their' 
activities to threaten the security of the country, 
and Rule 47 to detain those who committed *prejudicial 
acts*1 (speeches or publications, etc,)*
During 196?-, Section 144 was invoked almost every 
.month in one district or another,^
Even the national or Provincial Assemblies have not been
taken into the confidence of the government in either the
formation or discussion of government policies,!
Eecognising how entrenched the present government
1Khalil S* Sayeed, MPakistan? H m  Challenges to the 
Political System sw Asian Survey* 711, Ko«< t (Feb,, 1961), 100,
%EMd, & p, 100,
3Ibid,, p. 9f,
m
was, five opposition partita {the Awml I.©ague, the Jamaat- 
1-Islami, the Ifizasi-i-Iaiam forty § the National Beneerati# 
Front, and the Council Muslim league) formed a united front, 
the Pakistan Democratic Movement, in May 1967* A platform 
was adopted under which all the parties agreed to campaign 
for the return of a parliamentary for® of government and a 
legislature to he elected on the 'basis of adult franchisee 
The result of the unification Is Inconclusive at the moment 
to give m definite evaluation«*
JESUUsa* - M M M
Initially there was a ban on political parties* 
Following the 195® coup all political parties and groups 
were outlawed and Khan hoped, that this situation could be 
perpetuated* Howeverf Khan altered his position and opinion 
of the role and usefulness of political partiest
1 mast confess he one wigcaleulatioti in respect to the Constitution* having suffered through the serfid; 
of the so-called political parties, I was hoping that 
we would be able to run our politics without the party 
system* Therefore the Constitution was so framed that, 
in theory, it would function with or without politicalfrbiee* After the introduction of the Constitution, soon came to realise that on© could not do without political parties* Within the legislature the members 
could only he organised on the basis of party rule and 
discipline* Outside, there had to be an organisation 
to maintain contact with the .people* There w m  also a 
meed to explain government policies to the people in
hbld., p, 97,
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the country#14#; this could only fee dose by a politico! 
party* 3© I came to the conclusion that under our con­
ditions on® could sot really work the system without 
politics! parti#***
Jyub Khan is himself a member of the Muslim League, 
the party which was Identified with the independence move­
ment of the f 91G«4Qa0 To Khan# the League represents the 
only .national political party in. Pakistan, drawing. Its sup­
port from both province*** Whereas Khan states that «th# 
ideology of most of our opposition parties Is based on 
acute provincialism, religious exploitation, and extra­
territorial loyalty#*5 he hat continually considered these 
characteristics, in addition to the actions of the opposi­
tion in the legislatures when making, appointments to- fill 
a cabinet post in his government* Khan5® reaction to 
opposing political parties cam be noted in the statement 
•the opposition has been behaving in a way which has forced 
m® to rely entirely on my own party*^ However, Khan has 
registered his disappointment with the Muslim League*. When 
political parties were allowed to reform, Xhaa became a 
member of the League because he believed it was the only
*Aynb Khan, friends lot Masters* m * clt«, p« 221«
2For an opposing view, see Kfeslid B» Sayeed, "The 
Capabilities of Pakistanis Political System," Islam Survey 
(February, 196?), p* 109#
llyub Khan, .FgM^S S B  IMESS» SSL* £&«» P* 222 >
Hbid »« p, 222*
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party which had a national appeal and did not base itself 
on "acute provincialism, religious exploitation, .-and extra* 
territorial loyalty,"* However, there has been a continual 
development of cliques within the party* It has been re* 
ported that elections held within the party ranks of the 
league have often resulted either in iatra~party strife or 
aroused no enthusiasm at all, with business or tribal leaders 
being elected without any opposition* The lack of response 
has also extended itself into the political involvement 
which party members have pursued* President Khan has urged 
the party workers of -the league to visit Union Councils, 
hold.public meetings, discuss local problems with the people 
and bring their grievances to the notice of the government 
for action* however, since neither the assemblies nor the 
.party ©embers are requested to discuss the formulation of 
political policies, the members of the league have become 
.indifferent to the requests which the administration has 
made m  them* 2
Landlords
Of the interest groups, the landlords have expert* 
m m d the greatest Influence upon governmental policies*.
1S&ymd, "Pakistani lew Challenges to'the Political 
System," og* cltB „ p* 90*
*Xbi<U. p* 101*
Prior to 195f* the landlords exercised virtually a power of 
life and death over the large masher of tenant farmers who 
tilled their holdings* It was not surprising that these
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prevalent in Pakistani politics* There are several politi­
cal parties that are based upon religious ideology* the 
best example Is the Jamat-l-Xslaml The lusli® league 9 
the party of independence» m s  treated to farther Islam*
If the Mullah do have any political influence s it lies la 
the fact of their association with the mosque* Muslims 
pray five times a day and in doing so it affords the oppor­
tunity of individuals cosing together to discuss religious# 
political# and economic matters* In this manner the mosque 
represents a channel of mass communication*2
Students
The bsst'example of anomie interest since 195# is 
the student organisations* 1st® in 1964 riots broke out in 
Karachi when students picketed the state university* the 
students were demanding a series of reforms In the existing 
educational system* The demands ranged, from a fifty per 
cent reduction Is fees to the 'nationalisation of missionary 
educational institutions* In October of the same year# the 
student leaders presented their demands to the government* 
When a period of two months had elapsed and the government 
had failed to take any action, the students picketed*
Police were dispatched to the university to break up the
* Almond and Coleman, tit* * p* 19#*
20houdhry and Khan, £g* elt*, p* 95»
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lb la obvious that Ayub cannot merely rely on his 
traditional sources of strength— the civil service and
the army* He needs a well organised political party 
with an imaginative program which has appeal to all 
sections of the country, With an organised and popular 
political party* curbs on political activity may become 
unnecessary. Opposition parties faced with a well knit 
government political'party tend to tone down their extreme demands and try to reach a common measure of 
agreement with other parties to few a united opposi­
tion, All governments in Pakistan have tried to keep 
the country united through institutions like the army 
and the bureaucracy, hut no government so far has tried 
to build unity of lasting and durable mature which rests on political foundations**
the Feasants
Of the interest groups in Pakistan, the 'peasant M s
the least experience in politics* Isolated .from the large
centers of political activity, exploited, illiterate, and
often incapable of comprehending the complexities. of a
modern world s the peasant has often been overlooked or
disregarded by the political leaders of Pakistan, The
characteristics used to describe this section of the popu~
lotion are similar to those used to describe m peasant In
an agrarian society**-®, society in which the bulk of the
population is engaged in the occupation of subsistence
agriculture* Pakistan is m  agrarian society,
* , , a peasant in s wholly agrarian society, is 
generally poor and always Ignorant— bv the standards 
not only of industrialised, societies but also by his 
ora aristocracy. He is poor because of his primitive 
technology, because of population pressure, and because
"Th® Capabilities of Pakistan", Politicalpystea, gg, p* W *
m
the aristocracy m y  take from him whatever he proiuces 
in m m m  of his .most basic needs. this often means 
that chronic malnutrition and disc®#© or® the fats of 
a large part of the peasantry* What statistics we hare 
on per capita, income and: consumption9 average dietary 
level# infant mortality rates# and average life expect 
tancy in agrarian societies all document a material of 
life almost incredibly low by the standards of advanced societies*
Even where he is well-fed , however# the peasant Is 
ignorant.* lie is tied to the soil by necessities of his 
work# if not by law, and mobility beyond a very small 
radius seems to him neither possible nor desirable* 
Engaged in a subsistence economy, he is dependent on 
neither imports or exports from, his small village 
community* In such a society# communications between 
the village and the outside world m m  extremely limited# 
and so# therefore# are the peasants* knowledge of that 
world and his intellectual horiaom * * * Ignorance and 
isolation# however, are characteristics common to the 
bulk of the population, in #11 traditional agrarian 
societies* So great are they that th# peasants in on© 
village cannot even .know that there are .peasants in 
other villages like theirs# much less that they consti­
tute the great majority of the population of w their 
country” of whose w d v t w w  they may not ■ b& aware 
either*^
In test 'Pakistan the peasant has not constituted a 
significant political force because of the power which the 
landlords previously exercised over them* the. absence of 
a landlord elite in politically conscious Bast .Pakistan has 
enabled the .peasant, t# become more politically independent * 
nevertheless # the last Pakistani peasant still had diffi­
culty in responding to politics that were not identified 
with his village or town*2
fftMttoky, ga* £&&»* PP*
2ldgar L* Owens# ”Democratic Development in last 
Pakistan” (Washington, 6*0*, Embassy of Pakistan# 19641#
po 11*
m
The conception and adoption of Basle Seaocra©!®.# 
was an attempt to involve this group of the population into 
becoming m  active and knowledgeable participant in the 
domestic affairs of their community and eventually of the 
higher level# of governments the policy of Basic Democracy 
ha# been defined «*t
An attempt to revolutionize not only the tenure 
system or rural Pakistan hut the transitional political 
structure which enfranchise# landlord# and headmen* to 
the detriment of both modernisation and peasant wel* 
fare**
there .have also been extensive efforts by the govern* 
aunt to indue® change la the social and technological ©us* 
toms of the rural are##* Government programs have Improved 
communication and transportation facilities and therefore 
have afforded the rural families the opportunity be seek 
employment outside of the rural community* Farmer# have 
begun, bo accept and utilise new agriculture' techniques, 
while th# introduction of electricity has brought about a 
change in the recreational activities of the rural families* 
There have ale© been changes in the social, customs* Rural 
families are becoming lee# authoritarian and more democratic 
a# the role of women ha# been broadened* In If59# Family 
laws were introduced which guaranteed women more of an oppor* 
tunity to obtain an. education* Also included la the law
%* A, Wilcox# Pakistani Consolidation jg* a flatten 
(lew forks Columbia University Press# 19&3J# p« 209*
10*
was the abolishment of parentally arranged marriages* Iw* 
ewer, the speed of change has been sluggish in respect to 
the other institutions*1
The concentrated effort by the government to Stitt** 
late development in the rural areas has frustrated other 
groups in the society* the urban educated classes have 
complained that the Khan administration, has been too paternal 
and that basic democracy has been designed for the limited 
horizons of the uneducated* nMo doubt,” state# an article 
1® the flues*, the concern of the lhan government is wt© 
give the peasants a better deal*”2
1Ch0udhry and Khan, og* alt** pp« *6~**«
2fh.e .times fjondoj^, December ti, 1904, p* %
CHAPTER Y U
A CASE STUDY OP J&BCTIOKS IK A MILITARY 
OLIGARCH!: 1960*1965
A great, deal of interest, was aroused, by the an­
nouncement in March of 1962 that, the first election® to 
the national and frovtacial Assemblies under the new eon** 
stitution would be held during April and !%y with the 
go ,000 Basie Beaeerats elected in 1960 serving as an .Elec­
toral College for this purpose*
flie national kmmhlf ©lection® case first* Even 
though political parties were banned* a large number of 
those elected were formerly prominent in politics, many of 
them active in the old Muslim league* In the ©lections for 
the two provincial assemblies» however, former politician.® 
were not so successful* Meanwhile, the president issued 
another order reinforcing his ban m  political organisa­
tions of any kind pending action on the matter fey the new 
Motional Assembly*
In. spite of the president’s plea to the members of 
the.new assemblies to forsake partisan politic® and to give 
the new constitution a fair trial, many refused to cooper­
ate* they first took aim at the restriction on political
109
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organizations* After nearly six weeks of controversy, the 
president signed a bill permitting political parties, al­
though he refused to go along with a plm that M s  Elective 
Bodies (Disqualifleation) Order he rescinded*1 Bo also 
signed a Mil amending the Freve&tatlve Dewteatien Laws m  
that a person could not he detained longer than three months 
without the unanimous approval of a two-man board consist­
ing of a Supreme Court Judge and a senior government offi­
cial nominated by the president*2 During, a heated debate 
in the Bast Pakistan Assembly the Finance Minister noted 
that fewer persons had been held under preventative deten­
tion by the Khan government than under previous regimes# 
Under the Muslim League government* he pointed out*: ** .many 
as 1,3id persons had been detained; the United Front gov* 
©rniaenfc had held 32? personsf under martial law 305 indi­
viduals had been held, of whom only 111 were still detained 
(1963).3
With the return to politics, the government found 
itself' subjected to a barrage of criticism from a highly 
vocal minority in the various assemblies# the press seemed
1 flume orders were designed to bar from public 
office those politicians and civil servants convicted of 
corrupt practices while In. public office#
^Qsednow, £g« oito, p# 266*
3Ibid*
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delighted to have this additional source of news and opin­
ion, having been overly dependent m  relatively bland hand- 
outs from government administrative sources, The last 
Pakistan newspaper demonstrated a strong anti-government 
bias in their rendering of the news s with harsh anti* 
government articles* In duly 1962, the government black­
listed throe dally newspapers in East Pakistanj this meant 
that no government advertising was to be placed in them*
Even the pre-government newspaper* Pakistan limes 
(Lahore) provided a sounding board' for ant i -government 
charges* In one instance it printed a claim by a member 
of the National Assembly that the sons of the Aray generals 
were resigning from the Army to Join industry and that they 
had found this to be financially rewarding, the article 
constituted a full-blooded attack on the alleged tendency 
of influential government officials to get their sons and 
nephews into lucrative lobs with commercial firmsJ
the political development following the adoption 
of the Constitution was. a period of disappointment for 
Ayub Ibea* first ruling under Martial Law and then under 
the provisions of the authoritarian constitution* Shan 
had been able to initially resist pressures from political 
groups who wanted to have parties reestablished* Prior 
to the presidential election of I960* all political activity
Âyhto Khan, Friends lot Masters, op* pit*. p. 222*.
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had been banned* However, for the election all martial law 
regulations which prohibited the organisation, convening or 
attending of any political meetings were relaxed# Eventually 
Khan, moderated bin opinion of political parties and signed a 
bill which .again allowed for their formation#
The sane old politicians he had denounced on so many 
occasions cm© to the fore on©# more*’* those who had not 
been barred fro® political activity participated openly,
.many of the® winning assembly seats# Other .politicians 
operated behind the scenes# Meat organised political actio 
vlty seemed to be directed against the constitutional inno­
vations of the president#2
Ayub Khan viewed with obvious displeasure the 
behind-the-scenes political efforts of those he thought he 
had effectively barred fro® politics# On January ?> 1963, 
he imposed new political restrictions# The Political Par­
ties Act was amended to redefine political parties in the 
broadest .possible terns as "a group or combination of per­
sons operating for the purpose of propagating any political 
opinion or indulging in any other political activity* ** A 
further amendment prohibited disqualified individuals from 
associating thesselves with a political party, and the 
central government was authorised to direct any such person
*Ibid.» p* 221#
albid#. p. 2|2*
to refrain irom m f  press statements for a perled of si* 
months*^ Through these measures the president seemed deter®* 
mined to stop any political activity whatsoever on the part 
of the politicians previously disqualified under less strin­
gent provisions*.
In short# Ay»b Khan exercised a fim control over the 
government, The vocal politicians could talk and make head­
lines# hut they had very little power* Her was there any 
likelihood that the president would give politics a free 
rein# because the emerging, political leadership consisted 
of the old .politicians long sine® discredited in his eyes# 
lot until 19̂ 5 was there any real test of the acceptability 
of Khan*a .methods* At this time a hew Electoral College 
was chosen through elections* Potentially# under the terns 
of the Constitution# the Basic Democrats could elect a. new 
president and thus destroy the political system which Khan 
.had Imposed upon Pakistan*
The schedule 1965 elections brought forth an in­
crease in the activity among the opposition parties* Early 
in 1965 they began to search for a presidential candidate 
who would represent them* Eventually in September 1964 Mies 
Fatima Jinnsh, sister to All Jlnnah, was nominated, to repre­
sent the Combined opposition Parties la the forthcoming 
elections*
1Richard Wheeler# *Pakistan! Mew Constitution# Old 
Issues*1* Asian Survey (February, 1963),# p* 100*
m
The Combined Opposition consisted of five partita: 
the Councillors* Muslim League, which claims to be the 
true inheritor of the 014 Mhmlitt League (the President'sparty also claims the same name.); the Awaal C People4s 
League , « » ©sseatiaHy an last Pakistan Party; the 
National $mmi Party, a splinter of the Awami League, 
which adds support in the old Horth West Frontier region 
«- # * to its roots in last Pakistan; the Mizam-i-Isla®, 
a religiously based party with modernising intentional 
and the Jsmaat-i-Xslami, the party of out-and-out 
orthodoxy0
« . • Apart from Miss Jinnah, the Opposition parties 
hay# a common nine-point platform, but in fact this is 
more a statement of th# lowest common denominator of 
unity than a programme* Their real unity is negative, 
disapproval of President Ayub and the rejection of the 
polity he has established— one of whose main purpose is 
precisely to keep them out of power and to keep the 
executive free from their obstructIon*1
During the initial stages of the campaign Khan did 
not Journey about Pakistan in an attempt to gain support for 
his policies* However, as the attacks of the opposition and. 
Miss Jinnah intensified he began to travel about the country 
in search of support#
So far as political organisation is concerned, 
President Ayub is at a disadvantage# The five opposi­
tion parties which have rallied behind Mist Jinnah may 
be disparate and indeed irreconcilable when it comes to 
evolving a common programme, but they are as one for the 
immediate cause of unseating: President Ayub and des­
troying the system he has established#
The President, on the other hand, has not used him 
five year® in power to create a political following for 
himself and has to rely on on# of the two factions of 
the old Muslim League, a weak reed, especially in East 
Pakistan**
1The Times /Tondon7» October 12, 1964, p« t* 
2Ibid#, December 30, 1964*
115
For fcfals election every adult somber of the society 
would cast his vote in favor of the candidate he wished to 
fee a Basic Democrat. As outlined in the Electoral Act of 
1964t the %m  provinces were divided into 40,000 basic unit®, 
each unit electing a Basic Democrat„* the Basic democrats 
would then form the Electoral College that would elect the 
President and the National and Provincial Assemblies* The 
elections for the Sasic Democrats was held in November*
The completed elections for the Sasic Democrats did 
not end the campaign for the office of President,* Both 
candidates continued to seek support for their platform but 
now from the Basic Democrats* finally on January 2* i$$$ 
the Basic Democrats voted for their choice of President*
The tabulated votes gave Khan 63 per cent of the votes cast# 
while Miss' Jinnah obtained 39 per cent* The suspected 
claims fey the opposition that the elections were manipulated 
fey Khan’s supporter® were not substantiated to any extent. 
Prior to the election# Khan had announced that he would 
not tolerate any interference or participation in the 
"political fray" fey government officials*3
These elections did not increase Khan1® fondness for
*Xn December of 196? the Electoral College of 
i0#000 Basic Democrats was increased to 120*000 for the 
next national election* Similarly# each Assembly {National 
and two Provincial) was to have 208 members* as increase of 
slightly over 50 members each*
2Th& Times VTondonT,, December 30* 1964.
p®libieml process* X© him, polities * besides being distaste­
ful, is a, highly distracting activity which developing 
countries can ill afford* Elian hopes that through the 
system of.-Basle Democracies, political authority and power 
will flow in a simple fashion to the top of the pyramid, 
namely, the president* he had been under the impression 
that politicians arid political parties could be d*~l«g«llsed 
out of existence by having' them, branded as corrupt and 
irresponsible* However, soon .after the establishment of a 
new Constitution in 1962 and particularly after the Presi­
dential and Assembly elections in 1965,. politicians have 
been able to mobilise support among the non-ruling elite 
groups* Furthermore, through the support of the army and 
the powers that he enjoys under the new Constitution, Khan 
has been able to kmp the politicians, even after the lift­
ing of H&rtial law, in a state of suspended animation* *
1Khalid Bo Sayeed, *1965— an Epoch-Making Tear is 
Pakistan— General Elections and War with India,w Aslan 
iHSXig, n» !©# 2 {February, 1966), 76-B5*
COHCLUSZOB
Pakistan still represents the modernising oligarchy 
described by ShiIs, This does not tender the opinion that 
fro® 1955 to date political development in Pakistan has 
regained dormant*, Quite the contrary, changes were thrust 
upon the society. However, the broad spectrum of reforms 
introduced by the military and bureaucratic cliques did not 
necessarily mean a movement towards democrat!satlon, The 
introduction of Sasic Democracies and its system, was an 
attempt to Involve the rural population in the responsi­
bilities of modern politics and government« Also* is 1962 
a constitution was promulgated* However« the influence of 
the Sasic-Democrats upon the cliques was non-existent be­
cause of the bureaucratic domination of the decision-making 
process* the constitution was authoritarian in that it 
gives almost despotic powers to the president*
Under the tutelage of the administration, legisla­
tive bodies were created, but neither the president nor 
his cabinet informed or consulted with the assemblies on 
the political and economic policies of the government* 
Democrat! z©tion was further thwarted in the attitude which
m
ltd
the government retained towards their opposition# Politi­
cal parties have been permitted to develop, but the contin­
ued distrust which the government holds towards these groups 
and the 1aek of response which the administration has shown 
to the demands of the opposition groups has not altered the 
political make-up of the modernising oligarchy* newspapers 
continue to he censored or confiscated if adverse materials 
appear in their publications# Economically * Pakistan has 
experienced a respectable rate of growth and has not suf­
fered the mass starvation which India has felt the last 
few years,1 However, regardless of these development** 
democratic institutions have not been allowed, to grow# Hot 
until newspapers are allowed their freedom and political 
groups, whether they be of the opposition or the government 
party, are granted a voice in the decision-making process 
will democratic government b© realised.,
Pakistan faces a serious dilemma, A competent, 
modern, well-organised bureaucracy is required If public 
order is to be maintained and development goals realised, 
However, such a bureaucracy has a strong, tendency to 
monopolise all decision making of consequence and to prevent 
the growth of institutions which sight ultimately compete 
with it, iithout other modem institutions capable of 
harnessing and controlling such a bureaucracy, the prospects 
of democracy are dim.
is,, si®, saggatag, si, sis*, v- ’*•
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If democracy is to be realised.* governmental jxmar 
must be delegated to the institutions below the central 
geirercneat* Municipalities need the power to pans their own 
Inwe, to enforce thee© laws* and to levy t&%m9 all without 
the interference from higher governmental level** This mmf 
be- granted as long as the municipalities adhere to their own 
functions# do not deny the rights of the minorities# and 
respect the constitution*.
Turning to the military services* certain policy 
changes are desirable if the ultimate dictatorship of the 
military bureaucracy is to be avoided* The army sice must 
be reduced to minimise the possibility of a military die- 
tutorship arising* Also* a reduction in the numerical sis® 
of the professional military officers would eiislmte the 
possibility of a dictatorship*
The widely held view that only a powerful govern­
mental elite* unhampered by representative institutions* 
can speed political development in the new states deserves 
to be seriously challenged* But even if this view were 
sound# it fails to consider the Importance of democratic 
institutions* Is rapid economic growth worth it if the 
price is a totalitarian state? An uncontrolled bureaucracy, 
far from being efficient# may develop a vested interest in 
red tape# over-centralisation* and corruption* A powerful 
bureaucracy, anxlou* to perpetuate its rule may suppress
Institutions that are essential to economic growth, m  well 
m  to democratic government* This doe® not deny* however „ 
that a competent bureaucracy is one of many institutions 
upon which effective democratic government mmt he based*.
Appsrox
Aug* 194?
Sept* 194# 
©et* 1951 
Sept* 1955 
m *  I960
M* A, Jinnah
Kfowâ Ia liactmuddin 
Ghulaa Mohammad 
Xakandar lltria,
Ayub Khan
Sojsfe* 194i 
Get* 1951 
Sept* 1955 
Get. 1f5#
Prime Minlaker 
Aug* 194?
Get* 1951 
Apr* 1953
Aug* 1955 
Sept* 1956
Liaqu&t All Khan 
Kbuatja Nasi&uddin 
Mohammad All 
Chaudhri Mohammad All 
H, S* Suhr&vr&rdy
Get* 1951 
April 1953 
Aug* 1955 
Sftpt* 195# 
Got* 195#
m
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U8tE OF GHKOIOLOOI
Creation of Pakistan 14 * & 47
Hawalpindl Conspiracy 5 * 51
first Constitution Promulgated 23 * 3 e s#
Martial law Imposed ? *10 0 5#
land Reform Cottnivsion Appointed 31 .10 # 5#
.land Reform Commission Report Submitted 20 * 1 59
Partial lifting of Martial law 6 *12 o 59
Election of Basic Democrats 25 .22 o 59
foie of Confidence for Ayub Sbaa 15 * 2 * 40-'
Constitution Commission Appointed 17 * 2 .40
Constitution Commission Bepert Submitted 6 * 5 # 61
Constitution Promulgated 1 » .3 o 62
Election of national Assembly Members 4 0 62
Election of Provincial Assembly numbers 5 0 62
11setoral College Act 17 . 4 -# 64
Presidential Elections 2 . 1 * 65
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